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BT  715  . C6 5  1889  j 

Conn,  R.  R. 

Human  moral  problem 


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THE 


Human  Moral  Problem 


Sin  Inquiry 

INTO 


SOME  OF  THE  DARK  POINTS  CONNECTED  WITH 
THE  HUMAN  NECESSITIES  FOR  A 
SUPERNATURAL  SAVIOUR 


BY 


R.  R.  CONN 


NEW  YORK 

A.  C.  ARMSTRONG  AND  SON 
1889 


Copyright ,  18S9 , 
By  R.  R.  Conn. 


©ntbersttg  }j3vess: 

John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge. 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE  writer  of  the  following  pages  is  a  layman. 

He  has  had  no  instruction  in  theological 
subjects  beyond  what  he  has  gained  in  reading 
theological  discussions  and  in  listening  to  the 
utterances  from  evangelical  pulpits  for  fifty  years. 
During  one  of  these  years  he  had  the  privilege  of 
listening  to  the  preaching  of  the  talented  Charles 
G.  Finney.  All  this  has  left  on  his  mind  a  cer¬ 
tain  amount  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  way  in 
which  have  been  presented  some  points  connected 
with  the  human  moral  disabilities,  and  the  human 
moral  necessities  for  a  supernatural  Saviour.  The 
writer  would  claim  no  more  weight  for  his  thoughts 
than  the  thoughts  of  one  in  his  position  deserve ; 
yet  it  may  be  of  interest  to  the  pulpit  to  know 
how  its  utterances  sometimes  strike  listeners. 

So  far  as  the  author  is  aware,  some  of  the 
thoughts  expressed  in  these  pages  are  new;  at 
least,  he  has  never  read  them  in  any  book  nor 
heard  them  advanced  in  any  pulpit.  Neverthe¬ 
less,  he  believes  that  they  are  not  in  conflict  with 
the  doctrines  usually  received  as  evangelical.  It 


4 


INTRODUCTION. 


is  not  his  purpose,  however,  especially  to  defend 
evangelical  doctrines. 

The  little  word  “sin”  has  been  used  so  often 
by  religious  writers  and  speakers  that  it  has  come 
to  have  half  a  dozen  different  meanings.  In  its 
primary  significance  it  seems  to  mean  disobe¬ 
dience  to  the  Creator’s  commands.  It  is,  how¬ 
ever,  also  used  in  the  sense  of  temptation,  in  the 
sense  of  guilt,  in  the  sense  of  depravity,  in  the 
sense  of  shortcomings  resulting  from  weakness, 
in  the  sense  of  the  weakness  of  infirmity,  and  in 
the  abstract  sense  of  that  which  is  forbidden  be¬ 
fore  it  becomes  associated  with  the  subject  and 
has  any  guilt  adhering  to  it.  A  word  with  so 
many  meanings  becomes  too  indefinite  for  close 
logical  discussion.  For  this  reason  the  author 
will  not  use  the  word  “  sin.”  For  the  last  of  the 
meanings  given  above  he  will  use  the  term  “  the 
forbidden.”  This  phrase  will  occur  quite  often. 
It  has  a  negative  as  well  as  a  positive  sense,  — 
that  of  omission  as  well  as  that  of  commission. 

The  earth  has  many  problems.  They  pervade 
the  organic  and  the  inorganic  world.  Prominent 
among  them  is  found  the  moral  problem.  The 
earth  has  a  moral  problem  because  its  supreme 
creature,  man,  has  a  moral  nature.  A  moral  na¬ 
ture  implies  the  power  of  choice,  and  this  power 
makes  man  in  one  sense  a  first  cause,  and  thus  a 
likeness  of  his  Creator. 

The  general  features  of  the  moral  problem  must 
be  the  same  in  all  worlds  where  moral  beings  are 


INTRODUCTION. 


5 


found.  The  earth  probably  has  a  moral  problem 
with  special  features,  because  man  has  a  nature 
peculiar  in  itself.  But  this  we  cannot  prove,  be¬ 
cause  the  Creator  has  not  seen  fit  to  let  us 
know  whether  he  has  placed  moral  beings  on 
the  other  orbs  of  the  universe ;  nor  can  we  know 
whether  these  beings,  if  they  do  exist,  are  any  or 
all  of  them  like  man.  From  what  we  see  of  the 
general  diversity  of  the  Creator’s  works,  we  may 
assume  that  moral  beings  with  the  peculiar  na¬ 
ture  of  man  would  not  be  found  in  other  worlds. 
The  offering  of  the  Saviour  for  man,  though  su¬ 
pernatural  to  the  highest  degree,  even  to  the 
union  of  God  and  man  in  one  person,  seems  to 
be  a  feature  pertaining  to  this  earth.  He  repre¬ 
sents  the  remedial  plan  for  no  other  kind  of  moral 
beings(  but  man. 

Our  discussion  will  notice  the  disability  found 
in  man,  called  depravity.  This  disability  the 
Creator  did  not  originally  place  in  man.  He 
gave  him  a  plastic  nature,  whereby  it  was  possi¬ 
ble  for  him  to  bring  depravity  upon  himself  by 
disobedience  to  his  Creator.  Man  has  very  gen¬ 
erally  availed  himself  of  this  grim  privilege,  and 
depravity  is  a  great  factor  in  the  human  moral 
problem.  The  distinctive  feature  of  depravity  is 
that  it  produces  in  man  some  inclination  to  do 
what  is  destructive  to  himself.  It  will  be  the 
attempt  of  our  discussion,  however,  to  show  that 
depravity  is  not  the  only  disability  in  man  pro¬ 
ducing  the  inclination  to  do  what  will  bring  upon 


6 


INTRODUCTION. 


him  his  destruction.  We  shall  endeavor  to  prove 
that  there  is  another  disability,  more  fundamental 
and  of  a  greater  magnitude  than  the  self-made 
one  of  depravity.  It  was  found  in  the  first  Adam 
before  the  advent  of  depravity  into  the  world,  and 
it  was  present  also  in  the  second  Adam,  whose 
nature  was  never  defiled  by  depravity.  In  our 
discussion  this  second  disability  is  by  far  the 
more  important  and  fundamental;  but  the  author 
does  not  remember  ever  to  have  seen  the  thought 
in  any  work  on  systematic  theology,  or  to  have 

heard  it  in  any  sermon. 

Man  has  so  generally  become  guilty  and  gone 
astray,  that  to  meet  his  necessities  a  Saviour  was 
necessary  who  would  be  able  to  blot  out  his  past 
guilt.  But  the  blotting  out  of  past  guilt,  though 
so  indispensable,  is  not,  as  we  shall  attempt  to 
show,  his  greatest  or  his  fundamental  necessity 
for  a  supernatural  Saviour.  It  is  a  greater  ne¬ 
cessity  that  his  future  should  be  free  fiom  guilt. 
The  future  is  made  free  from  guilt  by  prevention, 
the  past  by  cure.  It  is  a  good  physician  who  can 
cure,  but  it  is  a  greater  physician  who  can  prevent 
disease.  The  God-man,  when  he  gives  man  strength 
and  victory  in  times  of  temptation,  is  greater  than 
when  he  forgives  man  for  past  offences,  and  sim¬ 
ply  removes  the  guilt  and  penalty.  The  former  is 
salvation,  the  latter  is  only  a  means  toward  it,  and 
only  valuable  as  it  contributes  toward  it.  Strength 
to  resist  the  evil  tendencies  in  man’s  nature  is 
man’s  greatest  necessity.  This  necessity  existed 


INTRODUCTION. 


7 


before  the  advent  into  the  world  of  any  guilt,  and 
human  nature  is  not  equal  to  it.  If  we  could  find 
some  one  who  had  always  remained  guiltless,  in¬ 
stead  of  finding  in  him  one  who  had  no  necessity 
for  a  Saviour,  we  should  find  one  in  whom  was 
exemplified  the  highest  and  the  most  perfect  type 
of  salvation  through  the  power  of  the  Saviour. 
These  pages  will  enlarge  on  this  necessity,  be¬ 
cause  the  author  has  listened  to  so  many  sermons 
in  which  it  was  left  out,  and  the  necessity  of 
forgiveness  made  the  all  in  all.  How  often  is  the 
statement  made  that  man  is  a  sinner;  and  this 
is  given  as  the  only  reason  why  man  needs  a  Sa¬ 
viour  !  There  is  a  strange  absurdity  growing  out 
of  this  position.  It  is  conceded  by  all  that  “  there 
is  no  other  name  given  under  heaven  whereby 
man  can  be  saved  ”  but  that  of  Jesus  Christ.  If 
the  salvation  of  Christ  is  the  salvation  of  sinners 
only,  the  conception  of  one  who  did  not  become 
a  sinner  would  be  the  conception  of  one  who  could 
not  be  saved,  since  there  would  be  no  avenue 
through  which  such  a  Saviour  could  reach  him ; 
thus  disobedience  and  guilt  would  become  neces¬ 
sities  to  salvation.  The  author  has  seen  persons 
who  held  this  theory  of  salvation,  grow  very  im¬ 
patient  and  almost  angry  with  one  suggesting  that 
that  there  might  be  those  who  would  grow  into 
obedience  as  they  grow  into  accountability,  and 
never  become  sinners.  To  admit  such  a  possi¬ 
bility  would  take  away  the  key-stone  to  their  the¬ 
ory  of  salvation,  and  would  let  it  fall  into  absurdity. 


8 


INTRODUCTION. 


It  is  not  our  purpose  to  inquire  as  to  whether  such 
cases  ever  do  occur  \  but  to  contend  for  a  theory 
of  salvation  which  will  still  hold  if  there  shall  ever 
be  such  a  thing  as  a  guiltless  person. 

The  method  of  questions  and  answers  has  been 
adopted  in  the  discussion  in  order  to  give  clear¬ 
ness  and  point,  and  to  use  the  least  possible 
number  of  words. 


Fitchburg,  Mass. 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


THE  FORBIDDEN. 

1.  Q.  Who  is  the  rightful  Sovereign  of  the 
earth  ? 

A.  The  Creator. 

2.  Q.  What  is  the  all-important  creature  of 
earth?  ' 

A.  Man. 

3.  Q.  Why  is  man  the  all-important  creature 
of  earth? 

A.  Because  he  is  created  in  the  image  of  his 
Creator. 

4.  Q.  In  what  does  this  resemblance  consist? 

A.  God  is  a  spirit;  man  has  a  spiritual  nature. 

God  is  an  intellectual  being  ;  man  has  an  intellect.  God 
has  sensibility ;  man  has  the  same.  God  is  a  moral  being 
with  freedom  of  choice ;  man  is  a  moral  being  with  free¬ 
dom  of  choice.  First  cause  is  said  to  be  an  attribute  of 
the  Creator ;  man  through  his  power  of  choice  can  bring 
about  events  without  the  necessity  of  an  external  cause, 
and  may  therefore  in  a  sense  be  said  to  be  a  first  cause. 


10  THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 

5.  Q.  Do  all  elements  of  earth  contribute  to 
man’s  success? 

A.  No  ;  though  there  is  enough  to  insure  success 
if  rightly  chosen.  There  is  much  that  may  be  chosen 
which  only  conspires  to  man’s  ruin. 

6.  Q.  Why  did  the  Creator  give  man  the 
power  of  choosing  evil  as  well  as  good? 

A.  This  is  the  necessary  outcome  of  his  free 
agency ;  one  of  the  attributes  in  which  he  is  the  image 
of  his  Creator. 

7.  Q .  What  did  man’s  rightful  Sovereign  do 
for  him  on  account  of  the  disastrous  possibilities 
of  his  free  agency  amid  the  destructive  elements 
of  earth? 

A.  He  forbade  man  to  taste  or  even  touch  the 
destructive  elements. 

8.  Q.  Why  did  the  Creator  thus  forbid  man? 

A.  Because  it  would  be  another  inducement  to 

man  to  go  in  the  right  direction. 

9.  Q.  Does  the  prohibition  of  God  prevent 

man  from  choosing  the  evil? 

A.  Not  necessarily ;  because  man  is  free  to 
choose,  and  in  that  respect  is  his  own  sovereign. 

10.  Q.  Why  was  it  necessary  to  forbid  man  to 
partake  of  what  was  destructive  to  him,  the  pre¬ 
sumption  being  that  he  would  not  choose  to  do 
what  would  insure  his  own  destruction? 

A.  In  the  first  instance,  man  is  supposed  to  be 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  some  things  are  destructive, 
and  the  prohibition  would  instruct  him.  But  this  is 


THE  FORBIDDEN. 


I  I 

not  all.  Much  that  is  destructive  is  also  attractive,  and 
the  prohibition  of  God  is  a  force  tending  to  offset  this 
attractiveness. 

11.  Q.  Has  not  the  Creator  given  attractive¬ 
ness  to  those  elements  that  contribute  to  man’s 
well  being? 

A.  He  has. 

12.  Q.  Is  the  attractiveness  of  the  destructive 
and  the  life-giving  the  same  in  kind? 

A.  They  resemble  each  other  in  some  respects, 
but  not  in  all. 

13.  Q.  In  what  are  they  in  contrast? 

A.  The  life-giving,  that  which  is  the  right, 
that  which  the  Creator  commands  to  be  done,  that 
which,  when.  done,  is  virtue,  always  promises  a  final 
good ;  but  the  destructive,  that  which  the  forbidden  is, 
that  which  done  is  disobedience,  can  only  promise  evil 
and  disaster  as  its  final  result. 

14.  Q.  In  what  do  they  resemble  each  other? 

A.  Both  at  times  produce  immediate  pleasure, 

and  at  others  they  do  not ;  both  also  at  times  produce 
immediate  pain  or  discomfort. 

15.  Q.  When  the  right  and  the  wrong  are 
pitted  against  each  other  for  choice,  do  these 
resemblances  always  appear? 

A.  By  no  means.  One  may  offer  an  imme¬ 
diate  pleasure,  while  the  other  can  offer  only  immedi¬ 
ate  pain  or  evil. 


12 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


16.  Q.  What  is  the  effect  when  such  is  the 
case? 

A.  When  the  right  can  offer  immediate  pleas¬ 
ure  and  the  wrong  cannot  prevent  immediate  pain  or 
evil,  the  safety  of  man  is  complete  ;  but  when  the  reverse 
is  the  case,  as  frequently  happens,  and  the  wrong  can 
offer  immediate  pleasure,  and  the  right  can  only  offer 
immediate  pain  or  self-denial,  then  comes  the  peril  of 
human  existence.  Here  is  brought  to  view  one  of  the 
fundamental  factors  of  the  human  moral  problem. 

17.  Q.  Does  the  forbidden  never  produce 

pleasure  beyond  the  present? 

A.  When  it  operates  through  the  lower  pas¬ 
sions  and  appetites,  it  evidently  does  not ;  but  when 
it  appeals  to  the  higher  nature  there  is  some  obscurity. 
The  forbidden  promises  reward  in  the  future ;  but  there 
is  a  question  whether  these  promised  rewards  are  not 
always  delusions,  and  the  actual  pleasures  all  confined 
to  the  anticipation  of  them.  At  any  rate  the  pleasures 
of  the  forbidden  are  but  for  a  season,  and  of  short 
duration  at  most,  to  be  followed  by  pain  and  bitterness. 

18.  Q.  How  does  the  final  reward  of  virtue 
compare  with  the  pleasure  or  good  that  the  for¬ 
bidden  can  insure  for  the  present  or  the  near 
future? 

A.  The  rewards  of  virtue  are  immeasurably 
great  both  in  duration  and  magnitude ;  while  the  most 
that  the  forbidden  can  do  is  to  offer  pleasures  of  grati¬ 
fication  of  a  trifling  duration  or  magnitude. 

19.  Q.  Can  the  forbidden  become  a  tempta¬ 
tion  to  human  nature  in  conflict  and  in  contrast 


THE  FORBIDDEN. 


13 


with  the  infinite  rewards  of  virtue,  when  it  can 
offer  only  trifling  pleasures? 

A.  Yes ;  temptations  of  such  extreme  magni¬ 
tude  and  power  as  to  insure  disaster  and  ruin  to  the 
whole  race  of  man,  which  can  only  be  prevented  by 
the  supernatural  interference  of  the  Creator. 

20.  Q.  Under  such  apparent  adverse  induce¬ 
ments,  how  is  it  possible  for  the  forbidden  thus 
to  captivate  human  nature? 

A.  Pictures  with  true  perspective  have  what  are 
called  vanishing  points.  An  object,  to  be  seen  in  the 
distance,  must  be  made  smaller ;  and  the  farther  from 
the  foreground  it  is  supposed  to  be,  the  smaller  it  must 
be  represented,  until  a  point  is  reached  in  which  its 
outline  vanishes  at  the  vanishing  point,  and  there  it  is 
rendered  invisible.  Time  is  a  picture ;  the  present  is 
its  foreground,  the  future  is  its  background.  Interests 
impress  the  sensibility  in  the  ratio  of  their  nearness  to 
the  present.  The  short  pleasures  that  the  forbidden 
offers  are  in  the  present  or  are  near  to  it,  and  its  long 
woes  are  in  the  future,  —  sometimes  in  the  far  distant 
future.  The  trifling  good  that  the  forbidden  offers  is 
always  in  the  foreground  of  time,  and  it  eclipses  the 
immeasurable  woes  that  must  follow,  because  these  are 
so  near  to  the  vanishing  points  of  the  future.  We  find 
this  principle  brought  out  in  the  Scripture  :  “  Because 
sentence  against  an  evil  work  is  not  executed  speedily, 
therefore  the  heart  of  the  sons  of  men  is  fully  set  in 
them  to  do  evil.” 

21.  Q.  What  general  attribute  has  human  na¬ 
ture  that  is  not  in  the  image  of  his  Creator,  but 


14 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


which  is  a  factor  of  great  magnitude  in  the  human 
moral  problem? 

A.  It  is  plasticity,  or  the  susceptibility  of  being 
moulded. 

22.  Q.  When  did  this  attribute  appear  in  human 
nature? 

A.  It  is  one  of  the  original  attributes  of  man. 

23.  O.  Why  is  it  not  one  of  the  attributes  that 

he  received  in  the  image  of  his  Creator? 

A.  Such  an  attribute  is  impossible  to  God,  who 

is  unchangeable,  infinite,  and  absolute. 

24.  Q.  Why  is  plasticity  such  an  important  fac¬ 
tor  in  the  human  moral  problem? 

A.  Though  not  an  attribute  of  the  Creator,  it 

enables  man  to  develop,  and  reach  higher  and  higher 
attainments  in  those  attributes  which  he  does  possess 
in  the  image  of  his  Creator. 

25.  Q.  What  does  the  fact  that  God  created 
man  with  the  susceptibility  of  being  moulded 
prove? 

A.  That  the  Creator  did  not  at  first  give  man 
that  high  order  of  being  which  he  intended  for  him  in 
after  time. 

26.  Q.  What  does  the  fact  that  God  created 

the  first  pair  with  plastic  natures  prove  in  regard 

to  their  standard  of  being? 

A.  That  as  regards  their  positive  qualities  they 

were  not  a  high  standard  for  us  to  aim  at.  They  were 
innocent,  there  was  an  absence  of  bad  qualities,  which 


THE  FORBIDDEN. 


15 


is  desirable ;  but  this  is  only  a  negative,  not  a  positive 
quality.  It  makes  no  difference  with  this  argument 
whether  Adam  be  considered  as  the  first  individual 
man  or  a  type  of  the  race  of  man. 

27.  Q.  Is  there  a  high  human  mark  that  is  fit 
to  be  the  aim  of  every  human  being? 

A.  Yes ;  there  was  such  a  standard  of  high 
quality  in  Jesus  of  Nazareth. 

28.  Q.  What  exceeding  peril  is  indissolubly 
connected  with  the  grand  human  attribute  of 
plasticity? 

A.  The  susceptibility  of  being  moulded  in  the 
direction  of  elevation  implies  the  same  susceptibility 
in  the  direction  of  degradation. 

29.  Q.  What  can  mould  man  in  the  direction 
of  degradation? 

A.  Doing  the  forbidden. 

80.  Q.  Is  the  degradation  that  is  brought  about 
by  doing  the  forbidden,  a  general  and  equal  degra¬ 
dation  of  all  the  powers  and  faculties  of  man? 

A.  No ;  it  does  not  reduce  the  whole  manhood 
in  an  equal  manner.  It  enlarges  one  part  at  the  ex¬ 
pense  of  another,  and  so  deranges  and  changes  the 
functions  of  the  different  powers  and  faculties,  that 
they  are  not  what  they  were  intended  to  be  by  the 
Creator. 

31.  Q.  Is  plasticity  in  man  his  fundamental 
peril? 

A.  No ;  man’s  tendency  to  do  the  forbidden 
lies  underneath  it. 


1 6  THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 

82.  Q.  What,  then,  is  man’s  fundamental  peril 
of  existence? 

A.  It  is  the  fact  that  the  forbidden  may  be 
attractive  to  him,  together  with  the  fact  of  his  free 
moral  agency. 

38.  Q.  How  came  it  about  that  the  forbidden 

could  be  attractive  to  man? 

A.  The  Creator  in  the  first  place  gave  to  cer¬ 
tain  of  the  destructive  elements  of  earth,  —  elements 
which  he  afterward  forbade,  —  a  nature  that  made  them 
attractive  to  man. 

34.  Q.  Did  the  Creator  originally  give  to  human 
nature  any  defective  powers  or  susceptibilities? 

A.  No. 

35.  Q.  Did  the  Creator  give  to  human  nature 
any  powers  or  susceptibilities  that  could  be  dis¬ 
pensed  with? 

A.  No  ;  man  has  need  of  all  his  original  powers 
and  faculties. 

36.  Q.  How  was  it  possible  that  the  destruc¬ 
tive  and  the  forbidden  could  have  been  attractive 
to  human  nature  in  its  original  normal  condition, 
before  it  became  degraded,  and  while  it  was  still 
what  the  Creator  seemed  so  well  pleased  with? 

A.  Man  has  certain  indispensable  wants,  some 
of  them  relating  to  life  itself  and  others  relating  to  what 
makes  life  desirable.  These  wants  are  immediate  and 
pressing,  and  must  be  met  at  once,  or  disaster  will  follow. 
Man’s  intellectual  nature  would  in  time  have  made  these 
wants  and  their  method  of  fulfilment  known  to  him,  but 


THE  FORBIDDEN. 


*7 

the  action  of  intellect  is  so  slow  that  man  would  have 
died  in  the  interval.  Hence  there  arises  in  man  the  ne¬ 
cessity  of  something  different  from  intellect,  —  something 
more  rapid  in  its  action,  something  that  would  impel 
man  to  his  wants  without  the  necessity  of  any  reasoning. 
The  Creator  gave  to  man  originally  just  this  kind  of 
power.  It  is  called  feeling,  or  instinct.  Its  demands 
are  pressing  and  it  acts  promptly.  It  is  blind,  however, 
not  being  able  to  discriminate  like  the  intellect.  Its 
pure  function  has  no  more  reason  in  it  than  the  steel 
has  when  it  tends  toward  the  magnet.  The  earth  is 
supposed  to  have  elements  enough  in  it  to  satisfy 
human  wants ;  but  the  Creator  in  his  wisdom  placed 
among  the  life-giving  elements  some  that  were  death¬ 
dealing.  Nor  is  this  all.  The  Creator  in  some  cases 
gave  to  the  death-dealing  elements  some  qualities  in 
which  they  resemble  the  life-giving;  and  this  resem¬ 
blance  was  so  great  that  the  blind  feelings  were  not 
able  to  distinguish  the  difference  between  them,  and 
desired  the  one  as  they  did  the  other.  We  thus  have 
the  key  to  man’s  original  susceptibility  to  sin,  —  the  fact 
that  human  sensibility  or  feeling  was  not  of  sufficient  re¬ 
finement  and  of  a  sufficiently  high  order  to  distinguish 
completely  between  the  life-giving  and  the  death-giving 
elements  of  nature. 

87.  Q.  Could  man  have  had  a  nature  that  was 
not  susceptible  to  temptation? 

A.  He  could ;  the  only  question  would  be 
whether  he  would  still  be  man  if  he  had  such  a  nature. 

38.  Q.  Why,  then,  is  man  subject  to  temptation  ? 

A.  Because  his  strength  is  not  equal  to  his 
environment. 


i8 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


NORMAL  AND  ABNORMAL  DISABILITY. 

89.  Q.  What  is  often  mistaken  for  and  con¬ 
founded  with  human  depravity? 

A.  Human  weakness. 

40.  Q.  What  is  weakness,  and  what  is  strength? 

A.  The  Almighty  is  the  only  being  who  is  de¬ 
void  of  weakness.  Man  is  weak  and  strong  according 
to  his  surroundings ;  if  he  is  equal  to  them  he  is  strong, 
if  not  he  is  weak. 

41.  Q.  What  is  the  difference  between  de¬ 
pravity  and  weakness? 

A.  The  same  as  between  the  child  and  the 
cripple.  Weakness  may  exist  where  there  is  perfec¬ 
tion  in  all  parts,  but  depravity  is  imperfection.  There 
is  weakness  where  there  is  imperfection,  so  that  there  is 
weakness  in  depravity.  But  there  is  also  weakness  in 
the  absence  of  depravity,  for  human  nature  may  be 
weak  when  it  is  not  depraved.  It  is  weak  at  all  times. 
Weakness  is  legitimate,  but  depravity  is  not.  The  Cre¬ 
ator  gave  the  original  man  weakness  but  not  depravity. 
Weakness  is  natural,  depravity  is  artificial. 

42.  Q.  In  what  do  weakness  and  depravity  re¬ 
semble  each  other? 

A.  They  are  both  sources  of  human  temptation. 

43.  Q.  Are  these  sources  of  temptation  gen¬ 
erally  independent? 

A.  No;  they  are  usually  associated. 


NORMAL  AND  ABNORMAL  DISABILITY.  1 9 

44.  Q.  Are  there  any  cases  of  one  in  the  ab¬ 
sence  of  the  other? 

A.  There  are  cases  of  weakness  in  the  absence 
of  depravity,  but  never  cases  of  depravity  in  the  absence 
of  weakness. 

45.  Q.  What  may  be  said  of  our  first  parents 
before  the  fall? 

A.  In  their  case  we  find  temptations  caused  by 
weakness  in  the  absence  of  depravity. 

46.  Q.  What  may  be  said  of  the  strength  of 
Jesus  our  Saviour? 

A.  We  believe  Jesus  to  have  had  two  natures, 
that  of  the  Deity  and  that  of  man.  The  first  is  almighty, 
and  there  is  no  weakness  possible  to  it.  If  this  part  of 
the  nature  of  Jesus  had  been  shown  in  its  full  power,  it 
would  have  changed  the  weakness  of  his  human  nature 
to  the  almightiness  of  the  Deity.  To  be  human  he  must 
have  been  weak,  though  he  might  have  been  the  strongest 
being  of  earth  at  that  time  or  of  any  future  time.  One 
purpose  of  his  advent  seemed  to  be  to  suffer  tempta¬ 
tions  as  we  do.  His  human  nature  was  not  imperfect 
or  degraded.  It  could  be  weak  and  perfect  at  the  same 
time.  Unless  it  was  weak  in  comparison  to  almighti¬ 
ness,  it  could  not  have  been  susceptible  to  temptation. 
At  the  same  time  in  comparison  to  the  strength  of  other 
men  he  was  strong,  for  he  spake  as  never  man  spake 
before  or  since. 

47.  Q.  How  could  Jesus  be  tempted  like  as 
we  are? 

A.  Whatever  different  schools  teach  in  regard 
to  human  depravity,  they  agree  in  the  belief  that  Jesus 


20 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


was  free  from  every  shade  of  it.  He  could  therefore 
have  suffered  none  of  the  temptations  that  are  caused 
by  depravity.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  he  could  be 
tempted  like  as  we  are,  to  an  extent  that  could  be 
called  human,  on  any  other  ground  than  that  the  temp¬ 
tations  whose  origin  is  human  weakness  are  generic, 
and  those  whose  origin  is  depravity  are  exceptional  and 
temporary. 

48.  Q.  Is  human  weakness  a  larger  factor  in  the 
temptations  of  mankind  than  human  depravity  ? 

A.  Yes ;  we  say  it  is,  and  shall  try  to  prove  it 
in  the  substance  of  what  follows. 

49.  Q.  Which  of  the  two  causes  brought  temp¬ 
tation  into  the  world? 

A.  Human  weakness. 

50.  Q.  Why  could  not  human  depravity  be 
the  original  cause  of  human  temptation  to  do  the 
forbidden? 

A.  Because  doing  the  forbidden  is  the  cause  of 
depravity,  and  must  antedate  it.  But  the  temptation 
must  always  antedate  the  actual  doing  of  the  forbidden, 
and  therefore  the  depravity  of  human  nature  could  not 
be  the  original  cause  of  temptation. 

51.  Q.  What  was  the  origin  of  human  weak¬ 
ness? 

A.  Strength  and  weakness  are  relative  terms. 
The  Creator  in  the  first  place  did  not  give  man  a  suffi¬ 
ciently  high  order  of  being,  or,  in  other  words,  sufficient 
strength  to  be  above  being  tempted  by  the  forbidden 
things  of  the  world  in  which  he  was  to  live. 


NORMAL  AND  ABNORMAL  DISABILITY. 


21 


52.  Q.  What  was  the  origin  of  human  depravity? 

A.  The  Creator  in  the  first  place  gave  man  a 

plastic  nature  and  the  power  of  choice.  By  abusing 
both  of  these  grand  attributes  man  became  the  cause 
of  his  own  depravity.  Primarily,  the  Creator  is  the 
cause  of  human  weakness,  and  man  is  the  cause  of 
human  depravity. 

53.  Q.  Does  the  advent  of  depravity  extinguish 
that  original  weakness  which  was  the  foundation  of 
man’s  susceptibility  to  temptation? 

A.  No ;  such  a  position  would  be  absurd. 
Wrong-doing  is  the  cause  of  depravity ;  it  always  tends 
to  disability,  to  evil,  to  death,  and  it  is  absurd  to  speak 
of  it  as  removing  weakness.  Its  whole  tendency  is  the 
other  way.  Wrong-doing  cannot  in  any  sense  extinguish 
human  weakness,  for  that  would  be  a  good.  It  is  for¬ 
bidden  by  the  Creator  for  the  very  reason  that  it  pro¬ 
motes  evil  and  not  good.  If  the  human  weakness  that 
produces  the  susceptibility  to  temptation  does  ever  be¬ 
come  reduced  in  man’s  nature,  it  is  done  in  spite  of 
human  depravity,  by  virtue  of  well-doing,  —  the  same 
cause  that  tends  to  reduce  depravity. 

54.  Q.  Was  there  any  force  that  could  extin¬ 
guish  man’s  original  susceptibility  to  temptation 
at  the  time  that  depravity  entered  the  world? 

A.  This  original  susceptibility  depended  upon 
the  original  strength  or  weakness  with  which  the  Cre¬ 
ator  saw  fit  to  invest  human  nature.  It  was  no  slight 
quality,  and  no  slight  force  could  remove  it.  It  en¬ 
tered  so  radically  into  the  very  substance  of  human 
nature,  that  no  power  short  of  a  creative  miracle  could 


22 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


suddenly  change  man  to  a  degree  that  would  extinguish 
it.  This  susceptibility  was  present  in  the  human  nature 
of  Jesus  our  Saviour.  It  is  absurd  to  expect  not  to  find 
it  in  natures  that  are  imperfect  and  of  less  strength. 

55.  Q.  What  is  the  logical  inference  of  all 
this? 

A.  That  man’s  original  susceptibility  to  tempta¬ 
tion  is  a  factor  still  in  operation  in  the  temptations  of 
all  men ;  that  the  additional  factor,  depravity,  which  is 
a  new  and  second  source  of  temptation,  does  not  neces¬ 
sitate  the  departure  of  the  original  and  first ;  that  both 
are  factors  in  the  temptation  of  man  as  we  know  him. 

56.  Q.  Is  it  possible  that  man,  through  his 
plastic  nature,  can  ever  reach  a  degree  of  strength 
that  will  place  him  above  the  susceptibility  to 

temptation? 

A .  There  seems  to  be  a  logical  difficulty  in  an¬ 
swering  this  question  either  way.  If  we  knew  that  the 
forbidden  things  of  earth  were  of  a  fixed  and  positive 
nature,  the  logic  of  human  plasticity  would  demand  a 
degree  of  positive  strength  that  would  match  them.  It 
may  be  that  the  forbidden  is  plastic  too,  and  that  it 
will  expand  with  the  strength  of  higher  attainments,  and 
that  man,  as  he  ascends  to  new  plains,  will  find  new 
fields  of  forbidden  fruits.  Our  limited  experience  looks 
that  way  but  does  not  prove  it.  We  know  that  the  Mas¬ 
ter,  with  his  superior  nature,  was  tempted.  We  shall 
therefore  assume  the  negative,  which  seems  to  have  the 
preponderance  of  evidence.  The  logical  connection  of 
our  subject  is  not  affected  by  either  answer.  We  shall 
attempt  to  prove  soon  that  there  is  a  possibility  of  the 


THE  TRANSMISSION  OF  DISABILITY.  23 

destruction  of  depravity,  and  consequently  of  the  temp¬ 
tation  caused  by  it. 

57.  Q.  If  we  have  made  the  logical  deductions 
correctly,  what  error  has  been  made  in  much  re¬ 
ligious  teaching? 

A.  Depravity  has  frequently  been  made  the  sole 
factor  in  temptation  since  the  fall  of  man. 

THE  TRANSMISSION  OF  DISABILITY. 

58.  Q.  Do  the  laws  of  human  plasticity  limit 
man’s  power  to  himself  ? 

A.  No ;  a  parent  who  has  moulded  his  own 
nature  by  good  or  evil  doing  may  transmit  a  moulded 
nature  to  his  offspring. 

59.  Q.  Are  the  mouldings  that  a  parent  may 
give  his  children  certain  and  uniform? 

A.  No ;  though  the  general  law  is  fixed  that  the 
child  inherits  his  nature  from  his  parents. 

60.  Q.  What  is  the  cause  of  so  much 
uncertainty? 

A.  There  are  two  parents  and  four  grandpa¬ 
rents,  and  thus  there  are  several  forces  that  may  operate 
to  make  up  the  child.  Sometimes  one  force  predomi¬ 
nates,  and  sometimes  another.  They  may  be  antago¬ 
nistic  and  counteract  each  other,  or  they  may  be  such 
that  a  general  blending  takes  place  and  no  distinct  in¬ 
herited  peculiarity  is  visible.  Doubtless  there  is  a  defi¬ 
nite  and  regular  law  underneath  the  seeming  confusion, 
but  our  knowledge  is  not  sufficient  to  fathom  it. 


24 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


61.  Q.  What  is  the  final  limit  beyond  which 

such  qualities  are  not  inherited? 

^  seems  to  be  an  intimation  of  this  limit 

in  the  second  commandment,  in  which  God  says  that 
he  visits  the  iniquities  of  the  fathers  on  the  third  and 
fourth  generations.  So  far  as  we  can  tell,  science  and 
general  observation  seem  to  indicate  that  single  pecu¬ 
liarities  of  a  single  individual  cannot  be  transmitted  for 
many  generations. 

62.  Q.  If  this  is  the  law,  how  can  we  account 
for  those  cases  where  the  same  tendencies  are 
visible  in  line  of  descent  for  more  than  four 
generations? 

A.  Children  are  liable  to  act  in  the  direction  of 
inherited  tendencies.  Such  actions  would  mould  their 
natures  in  the  direction  of  these  tendencies  if  they  had 
not  already  inherited  them.  As  it  is,  the  tendencies 
are  strengthened.  This  strengthening  is  thus  going  on 
through  the  actions  of  the  successive  individuals  at  the 
same  time  that  the  inherited  tendencies  should  be  fading 
out.  The  strengthening  may  be  equal  to  the  fading, 
and  thus  the  same  tendencies  may  be  kept  alive  indefi¬ 
nitely  through  a  long  line  of  natural  descent.  It  is  like 
a  child’s  hoop  that  continues  to  roll  after  the  force  of 
the  first  blow  is  spent,  by  the  blows  that  follow.  Thus 
depravity  has  rolled  down  upon  us  from  the  ages  by 
the  continued  wrong-doing  of  the  successive  genera¬ 
tions  of  man,  though  the  force  of  the  first  blow  that  was 
given  to  it  by  the  first  parents  was  spent  long  ago. 


DISTINCTION  IN  HEREDITY. 


25 


DISTINCTION  IN  HEREDITY. 

63.  Q.  What  distinction  is  it  necessary,  at  this 
stage  of  our  inquiry,  to  protect  with  the  utmost 
care? 

A.  The  distinction  between  man’s  natural  and 
his  acquired  qualities ;  between  those  attributes  that 
the  Creator  originally  gave  him,  which  are  necessary 
to  him  as  a  human  being,  and  with  which  he  cannot 
part  and  still  be  a  human  being,  and  those  changes 
that  are  made  possible  through  his  original  attribute  of 
plasticity. 

64.  Q.  Why  is  it  so  important  to  protect  this 
distinction? 

A.  Because  the  manner  in  which  the  two  classes 
are  transmitted  by  parents  to  their  children  are  so  radi¬ 
cally  different. 

65.  Q.  We  have  inquired  into  the  laws  by 
which  parents  transmit  acquired  qualities  to  their 
issue.  By  what  laws  do  they  transmit  those  quali¬ 
ties  that  are  original  and  cannot  be  acquired? 

A.  Moses  answers  this  in  his  history  of  creation. 
He  says  that  the  Creator  commanded  each  to  produce 
after  his  kind.  According  to  this  law  every  human 
parent  must  transmit  to  his  offspring  all  of  those  quali¬ 
ties  that  are  distinctively  human. 

66.  Q.  Were  the  first  parents  unique  as  to  the 
plasticity  of  their  nature? 

A.  No ;  the  Creator  gave  to  our  first  parents  a 
plastic  nature,  and  said  that  they  should  produce  after 


2  6 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 

their  kind.  This  implies  that  they  should  produce  in 
their  issue  all  the  attributes  that  the  Creator  gave  them, 
and  they  therefore  could  not  have  possessed  any  unique 
attributes  of  the  original  kind,  but  were  plastic  like  the 

rest  of  us. 

67.  Q.  What  does  this  fact  prove? 

A.  That  the  first  parents  were  not  unique  in 

their  susceptibility  to  depravity. 

68.  Q.  Were  the  first  parents  unique  as  to  the 
transmission  of  their  acquired  attributes  to  their 
issue  ? 

A.  No ;  the  Creator  gave  our  first  parents  cer¬ 
tain  laws  by  which  they  could  transmit  their  acquired 
qualities  to  their  issue.  The  Creator  said  that  they 
should  produce  after  their  kind,  —  which  means  that  they 
should  produce  issue  bound  by  the  same  laws  of  pro¬ 
duction  that  the  Creator  gave  to  them.  Therefore  they 
must  have  transmitted  their  acquired  qualities  to  issue  in 
just  the  same  manner  that  other  human  parents  do. 

69.  Q.  What  does  this  last  fact  prove? 

A.  That  the  first  parents  had  no  more  power, 
as  parents,  to  transmit  the  depravity  of  the  fall  to  their 
issue,  than  other  human  parents  have  since  had  to 
transmit  their  depravity  to  their  issue. 

70.  Q.  Were  our  first  parents  unique  as  to 
their  connection  with  human  depravity  in  any 
respect  ? 

A.  They  were  unique  in  being  the  first  ones  to 
bring  depravity  into  the  world.  This  does  not  signily 
much.  They  were  first  in  other  matters  too. 


DISTINCTION  IN  HEREDITY.  27 

71.  Q.  To  what  degree  could  our  first  parents 
transmit  the  depravity  of  the  fall  to  their  issue? 

A.  We  have  seen  that  human  parents  cannot 
transmit  their  acquired  qualities  through  many  genera¬ 
tions.  The  first  parents,  not  being  unique  in  this  re¬ 
spect,  might  have  transmitted  the  depravity  of  the  fall 
to  their  issue  for  a  few  generations,  but  not  more. 

72.  Q.  What  absurd  state  of  things  would 

have  existed  in  our  world  if  our  first  parents 

had  had  the  power  to  transmit  the  depravity  of 
the  fall  to  all  generations,  as  is  taught  by  some 
theologians? 

A.  All  human  parents  would  have  had  the  same 
power  as  the  first  parents,  or  they  would  not  have  been 
after  the  kind  of  the  first.  All  the  iniquities  of  that 
portion  of  the  race  that  became  parents,  and  whose 
lines  did  not  become  extinct,  would  have  been  visited 
upon  the  present  generations  of  our  world.  Cain’s 

murderous  depravity  would  have  followed  his  descend¬ 
ants  to  the  present  day.  If  we  can  take  the  flood  as 
literally  destroying  the  entire  race  of  men,  except 
Noah’s  family,  then  Noah  would  become  the  father  of 
all  those  living  since  his  time,  as  well  as  Adam.  Noah 
was  something  of  a  drunkard,  and  therefore  whatever 
of  a  drunkard’s  depravity  he  brought  upon  himself  must 
be  visited  upon  all  living  at  the  present  time.  When 
we  take  into  account,  in  addition,  the  fact  of  so  many 
drunkards  in  past  generations,  and  the  improbability 

that  the  lines  of  none  of  us  could  have  escaped  cross¬ 
ing  with  some  drunkard,  there  would  have  been  some¬ 
thing  more  than  a  probability  that  every  one  of  us 


28 


the  human  moral  problem. 

would  have  inherited  a  drunkard’s  appetite.  The  same 
logic  could  be  followed  out  in  other  lines  and  kinds  of 
depravity.  Such  a  state  of  things  is  supremely  absurd, 
and  would  have  extinguished  every  vestige  of  the  human 

race  long  ago. 

73  O.  Are  these  laws  that  govern  human  plas¬ 
ticity  themselves  plastic?  >  . 

A.  No;  these  laws  appertain  to  the  original 

manhood,  and  it  is  as  necessary  that  they  should  be 
immutable  and  rigid  as  it  is  that  the  bones  of  the  body 
should  be ;  otherwise  the  whole  manhood  would  fall  into 

chaos. 

74.  Q.  Are  the  laws  that  govern  human  he¬ 
redity  plastic? 

A.  No;  they  appertain  to  the  original  man¬ 
hood,  and  the  same  chaotic  result  would  follow  if  they 
were  not  immutable  and  rigid. 

75.  Q.  What  effect  did  the  fall  of  man  have  on 
the  race  of  men? 

A.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  transgression 
did  mould  the  natures  of  the  actors  to  a  certain  degree 
in  the  direction  of  debasement.  We  have  seen  that  the 
physical  effects  of  this  moulding  could  reach  only  the 
first  few  generations.  There  are  reasons  why  its  effect 
could  not  have  been  great  even  on  the  first  few.  One 
transgression  could  hardly  mould  the  nature  sufficiently 
to  be  appreciated  in  the  next  generation.  Only  a  long 
course  of  trangression  could  greatly  affect  posterity.  If 
the  first  parents  became  obedient  through  the  power  of 
the  promised  seed  of  woman,  as  soon  as  it  was  offered, 
the  depravity  that  Cain  and  Abel  would  have  inherited 


DISTINCTION  IN  HEREDITY. 


29 


would  be  very  slight.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  first 
parents  continued  on  in  their  disobedience  as  they  be¬ 
gan,  their  subsequent  acts  would  have  produced  mould¬ 
ings  in  the  direction  of  depravity  as  well  as  the  first  act 
of  disobedience,  so  that  the  depravity  that  they  entailed 
on  their  offspring  would  be  mixed.  Even  in  this  case 
there  could  be  only  a  small  part  of  the  actual  depravity 
of  the  first  few  generations  that  could  be  chargeable  to 
the  depravity  of  the  fall. 

76.  Q.  What  have  many  theologians  claimed 
that  the  fall  of  our  first  parents  did  for  the  world? 

A.  That  it  placed  in  store  for  every  one  of  the 
future  race  of  mankind  a  disability  or  a  curse. 

77.  Q.  By  what  method  do  these  theologians 
claim  that  this  disability  or  curse  could  be  fastened 
upon  the  sons  of  men? 

A.  Some  of  the  more  modern  teach  that  the 
fall  produced  in  the  first  parents  a  depraved  nature, 
and  that  they  fastened  it  upon  their  descendants  by 
the  laws  of  hereditary  descent.  The  older  theologians 
do  not  attempt  to  explain  the  method,  but  treat  it  as 
a  fiat  of  the  Creator. 

78.  Q.  What  have  theologians  taught  us  to  be¬ 
lieve  was  the  fruit  of  this  disability  or  curse? 

A.  The  more  ancient  taught  that  the  curse  was 
a  store  of  guilt  that  was  made  ready  for  and  fastened 
upon  every  son  of  man  as  soon  as  he  was  born.  The 
more  modern  deny  this,  and  teach  that  it  is  a  spirit  of 
rebellion,  a  taste  for  doing  the  forbidden  as  such,  that 
every  one  of  the  race,  as  they  claim,  finds  fastened  upon 
his  nature. 


30 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


79.  Q.  From  what  we  have  already  seen,  what 
shall  we  say  of  the  power  of  the  first  parents  in 
transmitting  their  depravity  to  all  generations,  by 
the  laws  of  hereditary  descent? 

A.  It  is  a  logical  absurdity  as  well  as  a  physio¬ 
logical  impossibility. 

80.  Q.  What  shall  we  say  of  the  guilt  of  the 
first  parents  being  placed  in  store,  so  as  to  be 
fastened  upon  every  son  and  daughter  of  man 
as  soon  as  born? 

A.  It  is  placing  our  Creator  on  a  par  with  what 
heathen  make  their  deities  to  be,  monsters  of  injus¬ 
tice  and  cruelty.  But  the  theory  is  so  much  one  of 
the  past,  that  it  does  not  deserve  this  much  notice. 

81.  Q.  Is  there  a  spirit  of  rebellion  in  human 
nature  that  is  so  generic  that  it  gives  attractiveness 
to  the  destructive  elements  of  earth  simply  be¬ 
cause  the  Creator  has  made  them  forbidden? 

A.  This  cannot  be,  for  two  reasons. 

82.  Q.  What  is  the  first  reason? 

A.  If  the  attractiveness  that  the  destructive 
things  of  earth  have  for  human  nature  is  founded  on 
the  fact  that  the  Creator  made  them  forbidden,  then 
all  that  is  forbidden  should  be  attractive  to  every  indi¬ 
vidual  of  the  race.  Common  observation  teaches  that 
this  is  not  so.  Though  perhaps  there  is  nothing  that 
is  forbidden  that  does  not  find  some  nature  to  which  it 
is  attractive,  there  is  no  nature  that  finds  everything 
that  is  forbidden  attractive  to  it. 


DISTINCTION  IN  HEREDITY. 


31 


83.  Q.  What  is  the  second  reason? 

A.  If  the  attractive  quality  of  the  forbidden  is 
the  fact  that  it  is  forbidden,  then  the  Creator  made  a 
great  mistake  in  making  it  so.  This  would  give  man 
new  inducements  to  partake  of  the  destructive  and  the 
deadly.  This  is  absurd.  The  Creator  did  not  give  the 
commandments  for  the  purpose  of  adding  to  man’s  in¬ 
ducements  to  the  destructive  and  the  deadly,  but  as 
counter-inducements.  And  these  commandments  have 
always  been  counter-inducements. 

84.  Q.  What  then  are  we  forced  to  believe? 

A.  That  the  claim  made  by  some  theologians, 
that  there  is  in  human  nature  a  general  spirit  of  rebel¬ 
lion  against  God  that  makes  us  delight  in  being  diso¬ 
bedient  for  its  own  sake,  is  not  true. 

85.  Q.  Can  there  be  found  a  sufficient  cause 
for  all  of  the  evil  tendencies  of  our  kind,  without 
a  resort  to  any  claimed  curse  from  the  fall? 

A.  Yes ;  man’s  evil  tendencies  are  all  com¬ 

prised  in  his  temptations  to  do  the  forbidden.  We 
have  seen  that  there  are  two  sources  of  these  tempta¬ 
tions, —  the  original  and  the  acquired.  The  tempta¬ 
tions  of  Jesus  were  wholly  of  the  original  class;  for  no 
one  would  think  for  a  moment  of  his  nature  being 

warped  by  the  fall.  These  temptations  were  the  more 
generic  and  important  part  of  human  temptations,  and 
have  no  part  or  lot  in  any  claimed  curse  that  comes 
to  us  from  the  fall.  If  we  exclude  from  the  problem 

all  those  temptations  in  which  Jesus  was  tempted  like 

as  we  are,  we  shall  have  a  remainder  that  is  not  as 
great  as  is  generally  supposed.  And  this  remainder 


32  THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 

can  all  be  charged  to  the  depravity  that  men  bring  upon 
themselves,  and  transmit  as  parents  to  their  immediate 
posterity.  There  would  be  nothing  left  to  be  charged 
to  any  claimed  curse  from  the  fall. 

86.  Q.  What  other  factor  of  much  magnitude 
do  we  find  in  the  problem  of  man  s  evil  tendencies? 

A.  We  have  thus  far  treated  the  attractiveness 
of  the  forbidden  as  a  simple  and  a  single  force ;  but 
the  forbidden  has  often  more  than  one  point  of  attrac¬ 
tiveness.  There  were  three  attractive  points  in  the 
forbidden  fruit  of  early  nativity,  —  it  was  good  for  food, 
pleasant  to  the  eye,  and  desirable  to  make  one  wise. 

87.  Q.  Are  all  the  features  of  the  forbidden 
attractive? 

A.  Never  to  the  original  and  undepraved  na¬ 
ture.  It  is  quite  a  question  whether  depravity  in  its  worst 
form  can  remove  from  the  forbidden  all  its  repellent 

points. 

88.  Q.  What  were  the  repellent  points  of  the 

forbidden  fruit  of  Paradise? 

A.  The  knowledge  that  the  fruit  was  deadly, 

and  that  the  Creator  had  made  it  forbidden.  The  half 
belief  in  the  lie  of  the  tempter  reduced  the  first  of  these 

points  in  a  measure. 

89.  Q.  In  the  case  of  any  forbidden  thing,  do 
all  the  forces,  both  attractive  and  repellent,  have 

a  natural  connection  with  the  thing  itself? 

A.  No rewards  and  punishments  are  always 
forces  outside  of  the  case.  When  the  Creator  forbade 
the  doing  of  certain  destructive  things,  he  added  an 


DISTINCTION  IN  HEREDITY. 


33 


external  force  upon  the  repellent  side.  The  prohibition 
had  no  natural  connection  with  the  case. 

90.  Q.  How  great  may  be  the  magnitude  of 

these  external  forces? 

A.  So  great  as  to  overmatch  and  destroy  the 

freedom  of  the  will,  —  that  is,  the  freedom  of  the  will 
in  any  particular  case.  Man  is  finite  in  all  his  powers ; 
his  free  agency  is  one  of  those  powers,  and  therefore 
his  free  agency  is  finite,  and  there  may  be  a  power,  even 
of  the  finite,  that  can  overmatch  it.  In  such  cases  re¬ 
sponsibility  and  guilt  cease.  The  science  of  moral  phi¬ 
losophy  and  theology  may  be  slow  to  admit  this.  The 
science  of  jurisprudence,  however,  teaches  it  as  a  fun¬ 
damental  principle,  and  coins  the  law  terms,  intimida¬ 
tion,  undue  influence,  and  duress.  The  proof  of  intimi¬ 
dation  or  duress  in  obtaining  the  signature  to  a  legal 
instrument  takes  away  the  responsibility  of  the  person 
whose  signature  it  is.  The  presumption  in  law  is,  that 
the  person  in  that  case  had  his  free  agency  overmatched, 
and  it  was  for  this  reason  inoperative. 

91.  Q.  What  is  one  natural  inference  from  this 
subject? 

A.  It  explains  how  the  undepraved  may  in  any 
given  case  be  tempted  as  severely  as  the  depraved.  While 
the  depraved  have  a  kind  of  force  in  their  temptations 
that  is  not  felt  by  the  undepraved,  the  undepraved  may 
have  a  peculiar  environment  that  will  produce  in  them 
temptations  equal  in  degree,  if  not  in  kind,  to  those  felt 
by  the  depraved.  Kleptomania  is  an  emanation  of  pure 
depravity ;  it  is  an  appetite  for  hiding  and  stealing  for 
its  own  sake.  A  person  who  has  perfect  freedom  from 
such  an  appetite,  and  to  whom  thieving  is  repellent,  may 

3 


34 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


be  placed  in  a  peculiar  position  where  much  wealth 
may  be  obtained  by  a  dishonesty  which  is  equivalent  to 
breaking  the  eighth  commandment.  He  may  then  be 
tempted  to  steal  in  a  degree  equal  to  the  impulse  of 
the  kleptomaniac,  and  he  may  yield,  and  be  confined 
in  the  same  cell  with  him  j  and  yet  one  would  be  bur¬ 
dened  with  a  depraved  appetite  and  the  other  would 
not.  The  same  subject  might  be  followed  out  in  other 
lines  of  depravity  with  the  same  result. 

92.  Q.  What  is  a  second  inference  from  this 
subject? 

A.  That  our  Saviour,  though  undepraved,  might 
be  tempted  in  all  points  equally  with  depraved  men. 
The  temptations  of  the  depraved  proceed  in  great 
measure  from  a  force  within  themselves.  The  unde¬ 
praved  have,  to  be  sure,  within  themselves  the  suscep¬ 
tibility  to  temptation,  but  the  moving  force  of  their 
temptation  proceeds  from  without.  This  was  so  with 
Jesus.  His  environment,  we  may  say,  was  miraculously 
suited  to  produce  terrible  temptations  that  seem  not 
only  to  be  equal  to,  but  greater  than  those  of  any  other 
man.  Jesus  seems  to  have  suffered,  though  undepraved, 
a  degree  of  temptation  that  would  have  crushed  into 
insanity  or  idiocy  the  physical  as  well  as  the  moral  na¬ 
tures  of  most  men,  —  perhaps  the  strongest  man. 

93.  Q.  Is  it  possible  for  any  of  the  race  of  men 
to  be  so  organized  and  under  such  favorable  en¬ 
vironment,  while  on  earth,  as  to  be  fiee  from  all 

temptations  to  do  the  forbidden? 

A.  It  is  true  that  the  factors  in  human  tempta¬ 
tions  vary  in  different  persons,  and  that  some  are  more 


DISTINCTION  IN  HEREDITY. 


35 


severely  tempted  than  others ;  it  might  seem  reasonable, 
therefore,  that  there  could  be  men  so  favorably  situated 
as  to  all  the  factors  that  they  would  be  entirely  free  from 
temptation.  Our  knowledge  of  mankind  shows  us,  how¬ 
ever,  that  there  is  no  such  case. 

94.  Q.  What  persons  and  conditions  would  seem 
to  be  the  best  situated  for  such  a  result? 

A.  The  first  man  and  woman  in  the  garden  of 
Eden.  Their  natures  were  free  from  all  unfavorable 
biases ;  everything  that  heart  could  wish  was  in  abun¬ 
dance  before  them,  and  yet  they  were  tempted  to  par¬ 
take  of  what  was  forbidden. 

95.  Q.  What  fact  proves  that  the  Creator’s 
original  intention  was  that  mankind  should  suffer 
temptations  in  the  flesh? 

A.  The  fact  that  he  planted  the  forbidden  tree 
in  paradise,  and  made  it  attractive  to  the  natures  that  he 
intended  man  and  woman  to  have. 

96.  Q.  What  did  the  Creator  know  would  be 
the  consequence  of  thus  subjecting  the  human  race 
to  temptation? 

A.  He  knew  that  he  would  be  exposing  the 
race  to  a  peril  of  the  greatest  magnitude. 

97.  Q.  Would  the  forbidden  be  a  source  of 
peril  to  man  even  if  it  were  not  a  temptation? 

A.  It  would.  The  forbidden  is  the  death-deal¬ 
ing,  and  it  is  a  peril  to  be  in  the  midst  of  the  death¬ 
dealing  elements,  even  if  they  are  repulsive. 


36 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


98.  Q.  Since  the  Creator  has  seen  fit  to  make 

the  forbidden  attractive  to  man,  what  is  the  effect 

on  man’s  peril? 

A.  It  is  immeasurably  increased. 

99.  Q.  What  peculiar  peril  is  connected  with 
the  first  temptation? 

A.  A  course  of  action  in  a  child  may  produce  a 
habit  that  will  add  force  to  the  first  temptation,  though 
the  course  of  action  had  no  guilt  about  it,  tor  the  reason 
that  it  was  previous  to  the  dawn  of  responsibility. 

100.  Q.  What  peculiar  peril  is  connected  with 

the  first  transgression? 

A.  It  plants  the  seeds  of  corruption  in  the 

nature  which  cannot  be  eradicated,  but  will  spread  till 
the  whole  nature  is  a  mass  of  corruption,  unless  there 
is  an  interference  of  deific  power. 

101.  Q.  From  what  we  have  seen  thus  far  of 
the  magnitude  and  peculiar  complication  of  human 
disability  and  peril,  what  must  we  believe  would 

become  of  the  human  race? 

A.  That  it  would  not  gain  higher  moral  at¬ 
tainments,  but  that  it  would  go  downward  from  one 
degree  of  degradation  to  another,  until  all  that  was  the 
image  of  God  had  become  extinct,  and  possibly  life 

itself. 

102.  Q.  Why  did  such  a  direful  state  of  things 
not  come  to  pass? 

A.  Because  the  Creator,  through  the  most  won¬ 
derful  miracle  that  the  world  ever  saw,  provided  a  plan 
to  prevent  it. 


DISTINCTION  IN  HEREDITY.  37 

103.  Q.  When  was  that  saving  plan  made  known 
to  man? 

A.  Not  until  man  had  yielded  to  temptation, 
and  was  actually  going  in  the  course  of  degradation. 

104.  Q.  Was  this  plan  an  afterthought  brought 
out  by  the  sight  of  man  in  his  impending  ruin? 

A.  No;  afterthoughts  are  not  possible  to  the 
Infinite  One.  The  plan  of  man’s  salvation  was  as  early 
in  divine  conception  as  that  of  man’s  creation. 

105.  Q.  Why  was  the  offer  of  this  saving  plan 
withheld  until  man  was  actually  in  the  downward 

course  to  destruction? 

A.  This  plan  has  many  phases,  and  some  of 
them  could  not  be  appreciated  until  after  the  overt  act 
of  disobedience.  It  is  salvation,  which  man  cannot  ap¬ 
preciate  until  he  is  lost ;  it  is  redemption,  which  man 
cannot  understand  until  he  has  felt  the  galling  chains 
of  a  degraded  nature ;  it  is  a  washing  away  of  guilt, 
which  man  cannot  realize  until  he  is  loathing  his  guilti¬ 
ness  ;  it  is  strength  to  resist  temptation,  but  this  does 
not  appear  in  its  full  value  till  man  has  become  weak¬ 
ened  and  broken  under  the  power  of  temptation. 

106.  Q.  What  was  the  overt  act  of  disobe¬ 
dience  that  was  committed  previous  to  the  revela¬ 
tion  of  the  Creator’s  wonderful  plan  for  saving 
man? 

A.  It  was  the  first  disobedience,  whether  that  be 
regarded  as  a  single  act  or  as  a  type  of  disobedience. 

107.  Q.  What  was  there-  about  our  first  par¬ 
ents  of  sufficient  importance  to  enable  them 


33  THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 

to  commit  the  overt  act  for  the  whole  race  of 
men? 

A.  This  pair,  or  as  we  usually  say,  Adam,  was 
chosen  as  a  representative  for  the  whole  race  of  man. 


MAN’S  FIRST  OFFICIAL  REPRESENTATIVE. 

108.  Q.  Who  chose  Adam  to  this  official 

position? 

A.  The  Creator. 

109.  Q.  What  were  his  qualifications  for  such 
an  important  office? 

A.  He  was  the  only  man  who  was  as  the 
Creator  made  him,  and  not  a  man  moulded  through  his 
plastic  nature  in  the  line  of  disability. 

110.  Q.  What  seems  to  have  been  the  purpose 
of  the  Creator  in  choosing  the  one  man  Adam  to 
represent  the  individuals  of  the  race  of  man? 

A.  To  try  him  with  temptations  and  to  present 
the  general  temper  and  tendencies  of  the  race  of  man  as  to 
the  matter  of  temptations,  and  the  necessity  of  a  Saviour. 

111.  Q.  What  would  the  trial  of  the  artificial 
disabilities  of  any  one  man  show  as  to  the  general 
tendencies  of  the  whole  race  of  man? 

A.  Nothing ;  because  such  disabilities  are  spe¬ 
cial  and  inconstant. 

112.  Q.  What  kind  of  disabilities  must  be  tried 
to  bring  out  general  truths  in  regard  to  the  whole 
race  of  man? 

A.  Those  disabilities  that  were  present  in  man 
before  the  advent  of  depravity;  those  disabilities  that 


man’s  first  official  representative.  39 

are  inherent  in  human  nature ;  that  the  Creator  placed 
in  man  as  a  fixture ;  and  that  were  present  in  the 
God-man,  who  was  devoid  of  all  kinds  and  shades  of 
depravity. 

113.  Q.  Why  would  Adam  have  been  an  unfit 
man  to  represent  the  whole  race  of  man,  if  he  had 
been  depraved  at  the  time  of  his  official  trial? 

A.  We  have  seen  that  the  purpose  of  the  trial 
was  to  set  forth  a  general  truth  in  regard  to  every  man, 
as  to  his  connection  with  the  perils  of  temptation,  and 
the  necessity  for  a  Saviour.  We  have  also  seen  that  the 
trial  of  artificial  disabilities  or  human  depravity  would 
not  set  forth  any  general  truth  in  regard  to  the  whole 
race,  and  that  only  a  trial  of  man’s  original  and  fixed 
disabilities  could  set  forth  such  general  truths.  Now,  if 
Adam  had  been  depraved  at  the  time  of  the  trial,  he 
would  have  had  two  kinds  of  disabilities,  the  constant 
and  the  inconstant.  If  one  factor  of  a  problem  is  in¬ 
constant,  the  result  of  the  whole  problem  is  inconstant 
and  uncertain.  Thus  the  trial  of  Adam,  if  he  had  been 
depraved,  would  have  been  of  no  value  for  the  purpose 
for  which  it  was  intended.  It  would  have  established  no 
general  truth  in  regard  to  all  men  in  connection  with  the 
perils  of  temptation,  and  the  necessity  for  a  Saviour. 

114.  Q.  What  important  event  was  divided  by 
this  official  trial? 

A.  The  Creator’s  revelation  of  the  human 
moral  problem. 

115.  Q.  What  portion  of  it  preceded  the  trial? 

A.  The  revelation  that  the  earth  contained 

dangerous  elements ;  that  certain  of  them  were  destruc- 


40 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


tive  to  man ;  that  man  had  a  Sovereign  who  was  his 
Creator;  that  as  Sovereign  he  commanded  that  man 
should  not  taste  or  even  touch  the  destructive  elements, 
lest  he  die,  thus  making  the  destructive  forbidden.  This 
was  the  first  stage  of  the  presentation  of  man’s  moral 
problem. 

116.  Q.  What  did  the  trial  of  man’s  repre¬ 
sentative  at  this  juncture  become? 

A.  It  became  an  object  lesson  in  the  revela¬ 
tion  of  the  human  moral  problem. 

117.  Q.  What  natural  divisions  has  this  object 
lesson? 

A.  On  the  one  hand  the  temptation,  and  on 
the  other  the  yielding  to  the  temptation.  Each  part  has 
a  separate  and  distinct  lesson. 

118.  Q.  What  lesson  did  the  temptation  teach? 

A.  That  the  destructive,  which  the  Creator 

had  just  made  forbidden,  was  attractive  to  the  nature 
he  had  given  man.  This  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  adds 
immensely  to  man’s  moral  peril.  This  was  the  second 
stage  in  the  moral  problem. 

119.  Q.  What  grand  department  of  human  na¬ 
ture  first  appeared  in  the  yielding  to  temptation? 

A.  Human  free  agency,  or  freedom  of  choice. 

120.  Q.  How  should  propositions  containing 
the  element  of  choice  be  treated? 

A.  Very  much  in  the  same  way  that  mathe¬ 
maticians  treat  propositions  coming  under  the  theory  of 
probabilities.  They  are  too  subtle  for  human  perception. 
Choice,  or  free  agency,  is  an  element  so  coy,  so  timid, 


man’s  first  official  representative,  41 

that  if  the  rigid  laws  of  necessity  be  applied  to  it,  it  is 
frightened  away.  It  seems  to  be  a  power  to  produce 
effects  without  a  cause,  or  perhaps  it  is  better  to  say  it  is 
a  power  of  first  cause.  When  this  element  enters  into  a 
question,  its  answer  becomes  a  matter  of  probability  and 
not  of  necessity. 

121.  Q.  Can  the  probability  of  a  choice  be  ex¬ 
pressed  in  known  terms? 

A.  In  some  cases  it  may,  but  in  the  more 
important  cases  involved  in  the  human  moral  problem, 
it  cannot.  If  the  inducements  are  equal,  the  chance  of 
any  one  choice  is  a  fraction  whose  denominator  is  the 
number  of  choices.  If  a  child  is  offered  his  choice  of 
two  apples  that  are  alike,  the  chance  of  either  choice  is 
one  half.  If  the  number  of  apples  is  three,  then  the 
chance  of  each  choice  is  one  third.  But  if  the  choice  is 
between  an  apple,  a  pear,  and  a  piece  of  coin,  the  case 
is  very  much  more  complicated,  and  it  would  involve  so 
many  factors  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  expiess  in 
exact  figures  the  relative  probability  of  each  choice.  It 
is  possible,  however,  to  determine  in  which  direction  the 
strongest  probability  lies. 

122.  Q.  What  was  the  probability  in  regard  to 

the  first  parents  eating  the  forbidden  fruit? 

A.  At  the  time  that  the  destructive  was  made 
forbidden,  and  before  it  was  found  to  be  attractive,  the 
probability  that  the  first  parents  would  not  partake  of  it 
was  so  strong  as  to  amount  to  almost  a  certainty.  If 
they  had  been  consulted,  they  would  have  said  that  they 
would  surely  not  eat  that  which  would  be  their  destruc¬ 
tion.  When  the  temptation  came,  the  case  was  seriously 


42  THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 

changed.  The  probability  was  materially  increased  in 
the  direction  of  their  partaking.  Yet  it  would  hardly 
seem  to  an  observer  whose  experience  was  no  greater 
than  that  of  the  first  parents,  that  the  probability  was 
actually  greater  in  the  direction  of  partaking,  for  the  in¬ 
ducements  were  a  thousand  to  one  against  it. 

123.  Q.  What  new  factor  of  his  moral  problem 
did  the  yielding  to  the  first  temptation  bring  to  the 
perception  of  man? 

A.  The  terribly  insidious  power  that  pleasure, 
when  it  is  of  the  present  or  near  future,  even  though  it 
be  temporary  and  trifling,  has  over  the  free  choice  of 
mankind.  This  closed  the  object  lesson,  and  is  the 
third  part  of  the  revelation  of  the  human  moral 
problem. 

124.  Q.  From  these  three  stages  in  the  revela¬ 
tion  and  history  of  the  moral  problem,  what  seems 
to  have  been,  at  this  juncture,  the  prospects  of  our 
first  parents? 

A.  Complete  failure  in  the  objects  of  existence. 

125.  Q.  What  did  Adam  thus,  as  representa¬ 
tive,  establish  for  the  whole  race  of  man? 

A.  The  strongest  kind  of  probability,  though 
not  a  necessity,  that  the  whole  race  would  yield  to 
temptation  and  do  the  forbidden. 

126.  Q.  What  did  such  a  strong  probability 
make  sure  for  the  race  of  man? 

A.  Taken  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  once 
doing  the  forbidden  fixed  irrevocable  ruin  on  every  one 
so  doing,  it  made  certain  the  sinking  into  ruin  of  the 
whole  race,  if  it  were  left  to  itself. 


man’s  second  representative. 


43 


127.  Q.  What,  then,  according  to  our  deduc¬ 
tions,  is  the  real  meaning  of  the  common  expres¬ 
sion,  The  fall  of  man  in  the  fall  of  Adam? 

A.  It  means  the  prospective  ruin  of  all  men, 
that  was  made  sure  by  the  test  of  the  first  man. 

128.  Q.  What  was  the  necessity  of  thus  early 
demonstrating  this  gloomy  prospect? 

A.  The  revelation  of  the  Saviour  was  to  be 
made,  but  it  could  not  fittingly  be  done  until  after  the 
demonstration  of  man’s  certain  ruin  without  one. 

129.  Q.  What  was  the  fourth  stage  in  the  pre¬ 
sentation  of  the  human  moral  problem? 

A.  It  was  the  revelation  of  this  Saviour. 

180.  Q.  What  do  these  stages  contain? 

A.  These  four  stages  —  the  commandment, 
the  temptation,  the  yielding,  and  the  Saviour  —  are  land¬ 
marks  within  which  are  comprised  the  whole  human  moral 
problem. 

131.  Q.  Who  was  this  Saviour? 

A.  He  is  called  in  revelation  the  seed  of  the 
woman.  His  name  is  Jesus  Christ.  He  has  been  called 
in  the  Scriptures  by  some  hundred  different  names  and 
titles,  which  bring  out  the  different  phases  of  his  per¬ 
sonality,  his  character,  and  his  life-work. 

MAN’S  SECOND  REPRESENTATIVE. 

132.  Q.  What  name  does  Paul  give  him  that 
shows  forth  a  peculiar  phase  of  his  work  and  per¬ 
sonality  and  that  throws  light  on  our  subject? 

A.  He  calls  him  the  second  man,  the  second 
Adam,  and  the  last  Adam.  These  all  mean  the  same 


44 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


thing,  and  show  that  Paul  wished  to  bring  to  notice  the 
fact  that  he  had  a  kind  of  correspondence  with  the  first 
Adam. 

133.  Q.  In  what  did  this  correspondence 
consist? 

A.  Man,  as  a  moral  and  responsible  being,  had 
two  phases.  The  first  Adam,  a  representative  man,  pre¬ 
sented  the  first,  and  the  second  Adam,  also  a  represen¬ 
tative  man,  presented  the  other. 

134.  Q.  What  were  these  two  phases  in 
manhood? 

A.  One  was  man  fallen,  the  other  was  man 
upright ;  one  was  man  doing  wrong,  the  other  was  man 
doing  right ;  one  was  man  in  the  rapids  going  to  de¬ 
struction,  the  other  was  man  standing  firmly  on  the 
rock  of  safety. 

135.  Q.  How  did  the  first  Adam  bring  out  the 
unpropitious  phase  of  manhood? 

A.  By  yielding  to  temptations  in  the  test  case. 

136.  Q.  Did  the  second  Adam  have  a  season 
of  temptation  that  corresponded  to  that  of  the  first 
Adam? 

A.  He  had  a  season  of  temptation  in  the  com¬ 
mencement  of  presenting  himself  in  the  Messiahship. 
The  localities  were  the  wilderness,  the  pinnacle  of  the 
temple,  and  the  high  mount.  This  experience  was  to 
him  a  private  one,  as  no  man  was  with  him ;  but  it  must 
have  had  more  than  a  private  significance,  or  he  would 
never  have  reported  it  so  that  the  world  should  know  it, 
for  it  was  not  like  him  to  make  a  parade  of  his  private 
matters.  It  is  eminently  fitting  to  consider  this  temp- 


man’s  second  representative. 


45 


tation  as  in  contrast  to  that  of  the  first  Adam ;  and  as  its 
result  was  victory  and  good  fortune,  it  brought  out  the 
bright  phase  of  manhood  in  contrast  to  the  dark  phase 
that  was  the  result  of  the  temptation  of  the  first  Adam. 

137.  Q.  In  what  light  can  the  second  tempta¬ 
tion  be  placed  that  will  prove  its  significance  to 
man  ? 

A.  Let  us  suppose  that  it  had  ended  in  yield¬ 
ing,  as  that  of  the  first  Adam  did,  and  attempt  to  meas¬ 
ure  the  magnitude  of  the  fall  that  man  would  have  had 
in  it.  There  would  then  have  been  no  doubt  as  to  its 
significance  to  man.  The  fall  of  man  would  have  been  a 
thousand  times  greater  than  in  the  other  case,  since  it 
would  have  taken  man’s  last  hope  with  it. 

138.  Q.  Why  was  it  important  that  the  test 
temptation  of  the  fall  should  have  a  counterpart 
in  the  temptations  of  the  Saviour? 

A.  The  test  trial  of  the  fall  established  two 
important  principles,  —  the  terribly  insidious  power  of 
temptation,  and  the  certainty  that  man  would  yield  to  it. 
These  taken  together  are  the  foundation  of  man’s  neces¬ 
sity  for  a  Saviour,  and  it  was  fitting  that  the  Saviour 
should  make  known  his  power.  This  he  did  do  in  the 
test  trial  at  the  beginning  of  his  ministry,  which  was 
probably  the  most  severe  that  was  ever  inflicted  on 
human  nature,  and  which  seemed  to  be  in  correspond¬ 
ence  with  the  earlier  trial,  that  established  the  necessity 
of  a  Saviour.  The  removal  of  temptation  from  the  world 
would  have  been  one  kind  of  salvation.  But  this  trial  of 
the  Saviour  proves  that  this  is  not  his  method.  It  also 
proves  that  he  could  enable  man,  with  all  his  weaknesses 


4 6  THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 

and  passions,  to  live  upon  earth  and  to  resist  tempta¬ 
tions.  He  resisted  in  his  own  power,  and  yet  he  had 
human  passions  and  weaknesses  like  the  first  Adam, 
who  yielded  and  fell,  and  like  human  nature  in  general. 
From  this  we  see  both  the  method  and  the  ability  of  the 
human  Saviour. 

139.  Q.  How  does  the  severity  of  man’s  two 
test  trials  compare  with  each  other? 

A.  From  the  scanty  history,  it  would  seem 
that  the  first  was  not  severe,  —  no  more  so  than  could 
be  looked  for  in  the  ordinary  human  experience.  But 
the  other  seems  to  be  greater  in  severity  than  is  ever 
found  in  the  ordinary,  or  even  the  extraordinary  ex¬ 
perience  of  men.  It  seems  to  have  been  a  season  of 
greater  severity  of  temptation  than  was  ever  inflicted  on 
other  men,  for  it  was  arbitrarily  and  miraculously  made 
severe. 

140.  Q.  What  was  the  purpose  of  such  a  con¬ 
trast  in  the  two  trials? 

A.  The  first,  in  being  very  weak,  showed  the 
weakness  and  utter  helplessness  of  man  without  his  Sa¬ 
viour.  The  other  made  conspicuous  the  more  than  suffi¬ 
ciency  of  the  Saviour  for  man’s  greatest  necessities. 

141.  Q.  What  other  important  purpose  does 
the  publishing  of  our  Saviour’s  private  struggle 

with  temptation  serve? 

A.  It  serves  as  evidence  of  his  incarnation. 
The  human  mind  naturally  rebels  against  believing  in  the 
incarnation,  and  the  most  positive  evidence  is  necessary 
on  that  account.  Had  this  private  struggle  not  been 
divulged,  there  would  have  been  no  positive  evidence  as 


man’s  second  representative.  47 

to  his  susceptibility  to  temptation,  —  an  indispensable 
attribute  of  humanity.  Elsewhere  in  his  history  we  find 
record  of  his  struggles  with  pain  and  sorrow,  with  the 
treachery  and  ingratitude  of  men  ;  but  it  does  not  clearly 
appear  that  he  was  beset  with  temptation  to  do  the  for¬ 
bidden,  though  that  was  probably  the  case. 

142.  Q.  What  important  purpose  does  the  pub¬ 
lishing  of  our  Saviour’s  victory  in  his  private 
struggle  with  his  temptations  serve? 

A.  After  the  first  Adam  had  by  his  fall  estab¬ 
lished  the  fact  that  temptation  was  a  power  that  would 
ruin  men,  and  the  Creator  had  promised  a  Saviour  for 
men,  it  was  a  natural  and  logical  presumption  that  that 
Saviour  would  remove  the  temptations  which  were  the 
source  of  the  ruin.  The  victory  of  the  second  Adam, 
who  was  a  representative  of  saved  men,  dissipates  this 
presumption,  and  establishes  the  fact  that  the  Saviour’s 
method  of  salvation  is  to  give  man  the  power  to  gain  a 
victory  in  the  midst  of  and  in  spite  of  temptations. 

143.  Q.  How  can  the  second  Adam  be  the 
representative  and  pattern  of  saved  men,  when 
he  was  never  lost? 

A.  Being  lost  is  not  necessary  to  salvation. 
He  was  a  pattern  of  salvation  in  its  completest  sense, 
for  he  was  saved  always  from  yielding  to  temptation ;  he 
was  saved  from  ever  turning  in  the  slightest  degree  in 
the  direction  of  being  lost.  When  men  are  saved  who 
have  been  lost  like  the  first  Adam,  they  receive  power 
from  the  Saviour  to  resist  temptation  and  become  like 
him.  It  is  not  necessary  that  they  should  become  lost 
in  order  that  he  should  save  them.  He  is  just  as  well 
able  to  give  them  strength  to  resist  the  first  temptation 


48 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


as  to  resist  any  afterwards.  He  is  able  to  reinstate  those 
who  have  become  lost,  and  thus  make  them  victorious 
like  himself ;  but  if  there  are  any  who  never  have  be¬ 
come  lost,  but  have  always  resisted  temptation,  he  is 
even  a  greater  Saviour  to  them. 

144.  Q.  Are  there  any  such  in  the  flesh? 

A.  There  seems  to  be  no  logical  difficulty  in 
the  existence  of  such.  There  is  no  good  reason  why 
the  child  should  not  grow  into  obedience  as  it  grows 
into  responsibility.  If  such  is  ever  the  case,  it  is  due 
to  the  power  of  the  Saviour  in  connection  with  the  au¬ 
thority  and  judicious  instruction  of  its  parents.  It  is 
not  easy  to  prove  the  existence  of  such  cases ;  but  it  is 
no  part  of  reason  to  deny  their  existence. 

145.  Q.  How  does  the  human  nature  of  the 
first  Adam  compare  with  that  of  the  second? 

A.  The  official  character  of  the  first  Adam  in 
connection  with  the  moral  problem  of  mankind  ended 
with  the  fall.  Afterwards  he  was  no  more  than  other 
men,  and  there  is  no  significance  in  the  comparison  be¬ 
yond  that  time.  The  whole  life  of  the  second  Adam 
had  a  significance  in  the  moral  problem,  but  the  last 
three  years  especially.  The  first  Adam,  up  to  the  time 
of  his  reverse,  was  free  from  all  inherited  or  acquired 
biases  in  the  wrong  direction.  The  human  nature  of 
the  second  Adam  was  like  that  of  the  first  in  this  re¬ 
spect.  The  first  Adam  was  up  to  that  time  free  from 
all  blameworthiness ;  he  was  innocent  of  all  wrong¬ 
doing.  The  second  Adam  was  like  him  in  this  respect. 
The  innocence  of  the  first  Adam  was  of  a  negative  sort. 
He  was  not  praiseworthy  any  more  than  he  was  blame¬ 
worthy,  for  the  reason  that  he  had  had  no  opportunity 


man’s  second  representative. 


49 


to  become  either.  At  the  first  opportunity  that  he 
had  to  establish  any  positive  character  of  any  kind, 
he  yielded  to  the  wrong  and  became  blameworthy,  and 
thus  ended  his  official  character.  The  second  Adam 
established  positive  praiseworthiness  of  character  in 
the  terrible  struggle  and  victory  over  temptation  that 
he  maintained  throughout  life.  The  human  nature  of 
both  the  first  Adam  and  the  second  was  susceptible  to 
temptation  to  do  the  forbidden.  In  both  cases  this  sus¬ 
ceptibility  was  a  matter  disconnected  and  entirely  dif¬ 
ferent  from  human  depravity,  that  is  so  broadcast  in  the 
rest  of  the  human  race. 

146.  Q.  What  remarkable  fact  is  there  in  this 
connection? 

A.  That  these  two  individuals,  who  were  the 
only  ones  that  the  Creator  ever  made  as  individual  rep¬ 
resentatives  of  the  human  race,  should  both  of  them 
have  been  without  human  depravity,  a  quality  that  is  so 
generally,  and,  as  some  teach,  so  universally  and  so  firmly 
fastened  on  every  other  member  of  the  human  race. 

147.  Q.  In  view  of  these  facts,  how  can  the  first 
and  the  second  Adam  be  proper  representatives  of 
depraved  humanity? 

A.  This  can  only  be  true  on  the  supposition 
that  human  depravity  is  only  an  incidental  and  not  a 
fundamental  factor  in  the  great  human  moral  problem. 

148.  Q.  What  two  facts  go  to  prove  that  human 
depravity  is  not  a  fundamental  factor  in  the  moral 
problem? 

A.  The  first  is  that  the  fall  of  the  first  man 
Adam,  before  he  was  depraved,  proves  that  there  was  a 

4 


50 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


sufficient  evil  tendency  in  every  member  of  the  human 
family  to  make  sure  his  fall,  without  taking  into  account 
any  force  of  depravity.  The  second  is,  that  the  second 
Adam  is  spoken  of  in  various  places  in  the  Scriptures  as 
human,  in  that  he  was  tempted  like  other  human  beings. 
This  could  not  be  true  if  depravity  were  fundamental, 
and  anything  more  than  incidental  as  a  force  in  pro¬ 
ducing  the  temptations  of  men. 

149.  Q.  From  this  light  of  the  subject,  what  is 
the  natural  as  well  as  the  logical  inference? 

A .  That  depravity  has  been  regarded  as  a  fac¬ 
tor  of  too  great  magnitude.  That  much  in  the  evil  ten¬ 
dencies  of  human  nature  that  belongs  to  man’s  original 
susceptibility  to  temptation  has  been  charged  to  depravity 
by  religious  teachers. 

150.  Q.  What  does  man’s  earthly  environment 
make  of  his  every  appetite,  his  every  passion,  his 
every  sentiment,  and  perhaps  his  every  intellectual 
faculty? 

A.  A  snare  that  may  lead  him  to  destruction. 
This  is  true  of  all  of  them,  before  they  are  in  any  way 
debased  or  warped  from  their  original  type.  This  is  the 
peril  that  was  shown  by  the  first  Adam  to  make  neces¬ 
sary  either  death  or  a  Saviour.  This  is  the  peril  in 
which  it  was  demonstrated  by  the  second  Adam  that 
man  could  live,  and  in  spite  of  it  could  flourish.  It 
was  this  peril,  and  not  human  depravity,  that  was  the 
sole  point  in  the  two  great  object-lessons  taught  by  the 
first  and  the  second  Adam. 

151.  Q.  What  does  depravity  never  do  for  man  ? 

A.  It  does  not  create  any  new  powers  or  sus¬ 
ceptibilities,  nor  any  new  passions  or  sensibilities.  It 


man’s  second  representative. 


51 


does  not  make  any  new  department  in  human  nature,  nor 
does  it  blot  out  any.  It  does  not  give  to  any  depart¬ 
ment  of  human  nature  its  susceptibility  to  temptation,  for 
where  this  is  found  since  the  advent  of  depravity,  it  also 
existed  before  that  advent. 

152.  Q.  What  is  the  effect  of  depravity  upon 
men  ? 

A.  It  is  great  in  various  ways,  but  it  is  not 
altogether  in  the  way  of  increasing  temptation.  It  has 
effect  in  the  belittling  of  self;  it  reduces  man’s  standard 
of  being.  It  may  increase  the  strength  of  some  kinds 
of  temptation,  and  weaken  that  of  others.  It  is  different 
in  different  men.  Insanity  and  idiocy  are  the  goals  of 
aggravated  cases,  for  a  drunkard  is  both  insane  and 
idiotic.  It  weakens  the  power  of  choice,  and  in  that 
way  takes  away  the  independence  of  manhood.  It  re¬ 
duces  the  power  of  resisting  temptations ;  but  though  a 
factor  in  temptations,  it  is  not  the  prime  nor  the  prin¬ 
cipal  one.  It  is  caused  by  yielding  to  temptation,  but 
it  then  turns  and  increases  its  own  cause.  It  moulds  in 
an  unfavorable  way  both  the  temptations  and  the  power 
of  choice  of  him  that  yields. 

153.  Q.  How  have  many  theologians  treated 
human  depravity? 

A.  As  the  sole  cause  of  human  temptation  to 
do  the  forbidden. 

154.  Q.  What  patent  facts  are  they  obliged  to 
ignore? 

A.  The  fact  that  the  advent  of  depravity  is  of 
a  later  date  in  our  world  than  the  temptations ;  the  fact 
that  the  Saviour  was  tempted  in  its  absence ;  and  the 
fact  that  even  depraved  humanity  must  possess  the  same 


52 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


elements  of  nature  that  caused  the  temptations  of  our 
Saviour,  or  else  he  was  not  one  of  us,  and  was  not 
tempted  like  us  as  the  Scriptures  declare  he  was. 

155.  Q.  What  is  the  reason  why  some  theolo¬ 
gians  so  unduly  and  persistently  magnify  human 
depravity? 

A.  It  seems  to  be  because  they  wish  to  release 
the  Creator  from  the  responsibility  of  moral  evil.  Deprav¬ 
ity  is  a  creation  of  man ;  and  whatever  of  moral  evil  can 
be  charged  to  depravity  seems  to  rest  upon  man,  and  in 
this  way  the  Creator  seems  to  be  relieved  of  responsibility. 

156.  Q.  Does  the  Creator  thus  become  relieved  ? 

A.  It  might  seem  so  if  we  view  only  from  the 

surface ;  but  if  followed  out  to  the  last  analysis,  it  in¬ 
volves  him  in  greater  difficulties  than  those  sought  to 
be  removed. 

157.  Q.  What  are  these  difficulties? 

A.  It  is  evident,  and  needs  no  proof,  that  dis¬ 
obedience  must  antedate  depravity  in  order  to  be  the 
cause  of  it.  It  is  equally  evident  that  temptations  ante¬ 
date  the  disobedience,  for  men  will  never  do  what  they 
have  no  desires  to  do.  Now,  if  human  depravity  is  the 
cause  of  all  temptations,  then  depravity  antedates  temp¬ 
tations,  and  we  have  a  perfect  and  a  beautiful  circle. 
Circles  in  logic  are  not  like  circles  in  mathematics  ;  in 
mathematics  they  are  logical  enough,  but  in  logic  they 
are  not.  They  destroy  and  dissipate  the  whole  problem ; 
they  bring  in  the  factor  absurdity,  which  destroys  every 
member  of  the  problem  found  in  the  circle.  This  circle 
would  prove  the  impossible  existence  of  all  three,  —  diso¬ 
bedience,  temptation,  and  depravity,  —  since  they  would 


man’s  second  representative. 


53 


all  antedate  and  cause  each  other,  which  is  supreme 
absurdity.  It  does  not  relieve  the  Creator  to  involve 
him  in  such  an  absurdity.  Again,  depravity  is  possible 
to  man  only  because  his  Creator  so  fashioned  him ;  and 
if  it  is  the  sole  cause  of  man’s  temptations,  and  thus  of 
moral  evil,  then  the  Creator  is  just  as  positively  responsi¬ 
ble  for  moral  evil  as  he  is  on  the  supposition  that  he 
gave  him  originally  the  susceptibility  to  temptation.  The 
difficulty  is  not  removed  by  being  disguised,  —  by  being 
placed  one  step  farther  back.  It  is  impossible  to  avoid 
the  Creator’s  sovereignty  in  the  moral  evils  and  the 
moral  problem  of  man.  This  sovereignty  does  hot 
destroy  man’s  free  agency,  but  it  does  involve  him  in 
hardships  that  try  that  God-like  attribute. 

158.  Q.  As  touching  this  matter,  what  do  truth 
and  candor  compel  us  to  believe? 

A.  That  the  Creator  originally  and  purposely 
gave  man  a  nature  that  was  susceptible  to  temptation, 
that  he  also  gave  him  free  agency,  and  that  he  also  did 
this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  knew  it  would  insure  the 
ruin  of  many,  though  the  Saviour  were  free  to  all. 

159.  Q.  Are  the  Creator’s  plans  and  methods 
in  harmony  with  perfect  justice  and  love? 

A.  We  say  and  believe  that  they  are. 

160.  Q.  Can  we  make  this  harmony  appear  in 
all  departments  of  creation? 

A.  We  cannot ;  we  may  do  it  in  general,  but 
not  in  particular  cases.  It  is  easy  for  us  to  conceive, 
and  perhaps  to  perceive,  that  the  Creator’s  plans  ac¬ 
complish  the  greatest  good  for  the  greatest  numbers ; 
but  our  ideas  of  eminent  domain  are  such  that  we  in¬ 
stinctively  feel  that  if  the  individual  gives  up  or  suffers 


54 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


for  the  general  good,  he  should  in  some  way  receive  a 
compensation.  We  see  in  our  world  much  individual 
suffering  in  the  interest  of  our  Creator’s  great  plan  for 
the  good  of  man  as  a  whole.  This  suffering  is  partly 
deserved  and  partly  undeserved.  There  is  no  possible 
way  that  these  sufferers  can  receive  compensation  in 
this  world ;  but  we  hope,  and  often  say,  that  these 
things  will  be  made  all  right  in  the  world  to  come. 
This  world  to  come  is,  however,  so  misty  and  impenetra¬ 
ble,  that  we  are  obliged  to  leave  this  matter  of  harmony 
in  individual  cases  simply  resting  upon  hope. 

161.  Q.  As  touching  the  moral  problem  of  man, 
what  are  the  two  great  and  vital  questions? 

A.  What  are  man’s  necessities,  and  how  does 
the  Saviour  that  is  offered  for  him  meet  these  necessities. 

162.  Q.  What  are  man’s  necessities? 

A.  We  have  seen,  in  the  progress  of  our  analy¬ 
sis,  that  man’s  peril  upon  earth  is  his  frightful  tendency 
to  do  the  forbidden,  which  is  destructive  to  him.  The.re 
are  two  different  necessities  growing  out  of  this  peril. 
We  have  seen  that  this  tendency  is  so  great  and  insid¬ 
ious  that  a  large  number  of  the  race  (some  theologians 
say  there  are  no  exceptions)  will  some  time  in  their  lives 
surely  yield  to  it.  We  have  also  seen  that  once  doing 
the  forbidden  infects  the  nature  with  a  moral  disease  that 
eventually  produces  ruin,  in  spite  of  every  human  power 
to  prevent  it.  Thus  comes  the  necessity  of  a  supernatural 
power,  to  purge  man  of  such  infection.  But  man  has 
another  necessity.  There  is  very  little  of  true  salvation 
in  oft-repeated  infection  and  cure,  in  a  continual  falling 
and  being  lifted  up.  Man  needs  a  supernatural  strength 
to  offset  the  insidious  power  of  temptation. 


PREVENTION  AND  CURE. 


55 


PREVENTION  AS  DISTINGUISHED  FROM  CURE. 

163.  Q.  What  is  the  grand  distinction  in  these 
two  necessities? 

A.  One  is  the  cure  of  moral  disease,  and  the 
other  is  the  prevention  of  it. 

164.  Q.  Which  is  the  more  fundamental  and 
important  in  man’s  salvation? 

A.  It  is  evident  that  prevention  is  ;  for  a  state 
of  complete  prevention  from  moral  disease  is  salvation 
itself.  Cure  is  always  a  necessity  when  prevention  is  not 
complete.  When  prevention  has  been  complete  from 
the  first,  cure  does  not  become  a  necessity,  as  was  true 
of  the  great  Physician  himself.  Prevention  is  the  end ; 
a  cure  may  be  the  means  to  the  end,  but  nothing  more, 
and  it  is  of  value  only  as  it  contributes  to  the  end,  which 
is  the  exemption  from  disease.  Prevention  is  thus  fun¬ 
damental,  while  cure  is  incidental. 

165.  Q.  What  important  matters  are  indis¬ 
solubly  connected  with  the  incidental  in  man’s 
salvation? 

A.  Repentance,  conversion,  regeneration,  atone¬ 
ment,  and  others. 

166.  Q.  How  can  it  be  shown  that  all  these 
important  matters  are  only  incidental  to  Christian 
life  and  salvation? 

A.  The  most  perfect  Christian  character  that 
ever  lived  was  perfect  in  the  absence  of  them.  He  was 
the  great  pattern  for  men  to  follow,  and  thus  these  fac- 


56 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


tors  become  man’s  necessity  because  he  does  not  follow 
his  pattern.  If  there  are  any  that  follow  their  pattern 
from  the  first,  these  incidental  factors  are  no  more 
necessary  for  them  than  they  were  for  the  pattern 
Christ. 

167.  Q.  Did  the  Saviour  need  a  Saviour? 

A.  The  same  susceptibility  to  temptation  that 
the  Creator  saw  fit  to  place  in  human  nature  was  like¬ 
wise  in  the  human  nature  of  Christ.  His  environment, 
especially  at  the  time  of  his  official  trial,  seemed  to  be 
prepared  to  intensify  that  susceptibility,  and  he  needed 
superhuman  power  to  prevent  his  yielding  to  this  temp¬ 
tation.  He  found  that  power  in  his  own  deific  self. 
His  necessity  for  a  Saviour  was  of  the  fundamental  kind, 
and  is  always  found  in  every  man,  both  Christian  and 
otherwise.  It  is  that  which  always  adheres  to  man  in 
the  flesh.  The  other  necessity  which  is  incidental  to 
fallen  man  was  not  found  in  Christ. 

168.  Q.  How  is  the  human  necessity  for  a 
Saviour  made  manifest  by  the  official  trials  of 
the  first  and  second  Adam? 

A .  A  trial,  or  test,  whether  of  men  or  things,  is 
always,  in  a  strict  sense,  ordered  to  find  out  or  to  set  forth 
attributes  which  existed  before  the  trial,  and  not  those 
that  the  result  of  the  trial  may  originate.  The  first 
official  trial  in  which  all  men  were  represented  did  set 
forth  that  dangerous  susceptibility  to  temptation  with 
which  the  Creator  saw  fit  to  invest  human  nature.  The 
result  of  the  trial  set  forth  the  fact  that  if  human  nature 
was  left  to  its  own  resources,  it  would  surely  go  to  ruin 
and  moral  death.  Thus  did  temptation  and  the  yielding 


PREVENTION  AND  CURE. 


57 


set  forth  only  that  fundamental  necessity  of  a  supernatu¬ 
ral  power  to  enable  them  to  resist  temptation,  that  adheres 
to  all  men,  whether  fallen  or  not  fallen.  But  the  effect 
of  the  trial  originated  in  man  a  moral  disease,  or  excres¬ 
cence,  which  did  not  exist  before,  and  which  the  Creator 
did  not  implant  in  human  nature.  The  Creator  did  not 
give  to  human  nature  itself  the  power  to  cure  or  remove 
this  disease.  Hence  arose  our  second  necessity.  The 
second  official  trial  only  set  forth  man’s  fundamental  ne¬ 
cessity  for  a  Saviour,  and  this  still  more  vividly  than  did 
the  first.  The  second  necessity,  which  we  have  termed 
incidental,  had  no  connection  with  the  second  trial, 
for  the  second  trial  did  not  set  forth  the  necessity  for  a 
Saviour  to  forgive. 

169.  Q.  What,  then,  is  the  parallel  between 
man’s  two  necessities  for  a  superhuman  Saviour, 
—  the  one  to  preserve  him  blameless,  and  the  other 
to  forgive  him? 

A.  The  one  is  the  creation  of  God,  the  other 
of  man ;  the  one  emanates  from  human  nature  in  its 
healthy  normal  state,  the  other  from  human  nature  when 
it  has  become  diseased  and  abnormal ;  the  one  the  Crea¬ 
tor  intended  to  be  a  fixture,  the  other  need  never  have 
been,  and  may  be  done  away  with ;  the  one  was  present 
in  Paradise  with  the  pure  natures  of  the  first  parents,  the 
advent  of  the  other  was  of  a  later  date ;  the  one  was  not 
lost,  though  the  other  was  born,  when  Paradise  was  lost ; 
the  one  will  still  live  in  Paradise  regained,  the  other  will 
disappear  when  Paradise  is  completely  regained  ;  the  one 
was  in  the  humanity  of  the  Saviour,  the  other  was  always 
a  stranger  to  it.  For  these  reasons  we  may  regard  the 
one  as  fundamental  and  the  other  as  incidental. 


58 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


170.  Q.  How  can  that  be  incidental  which  the 
Scriptures  made  so  prominent? 

A.  It  is  the  grand  starting-point  in  a  change 
of  life  and  character,  and  is  all  important  for  that  reason. 
Man  has  generally  made  it  a  necessity  unto  himself,  yet 
he  is  able  to  place  himself  above  that  necessity,  as  did 
the  first  Great  Example.  But  he  can  never  rise  above 
that  other  necessity,  for  even  the  Great  Example  himself 
did  not.  The  Lord’s  Prayer  notices  both  of  man’s  ne¬ 
cessities,  —  forgiveness  of  trespasses  and  deliverance  from 
temptation.  When  the  deliverance  from  yielding  to  temp¬ 
tation  is  complete,  the  necessity  for  a  Saviour  to  forgive 
is  concluded.  The  Master  himself  was  thus  delivered. 

171.  Q.  John  said,  “  Behold  the  Lamb  of  God, 
that  taketh  away  the  sins  of  the  world.”  What 
could  John  have  meant  by  this? 

A.  It  seems  to  be  something  deeper  and  more 
fundamental  than  pardoning  the  sins  of  the  world.  It 
seems  to  strike  the  sins  themselves,  and  to  reduce  the 
very  causes  that  have  made  the  Saviour  a  necessity  for 
the  world.  The  hand  of  God  prevents  disobedience. 

172.  Q.  How  can  the  Lamb  of  God  take  away 
the  sin  of  the  world? 

A.  He  can  do  it  by  imparting  to  men  the 
power  he  manifested,  as  second  Adam,  in  resisting 
temptation. 

173.  Q.  Why  is  not  this  power,  which  was 
sufficient  for  the  Christ,  all-sufficient  for  all  other 
men? 

A .  It  would  be,  if  all  men  would  avail  them¬ 
selves  of  it  and  resist  temptation  from  the  first.  But 


PREVENTION  AND  CURE. 


59 


they  do  not ;  and  they  thus  bring  a  new  factor  into  the 
moral  problem  that  was  not  implanted  in  it  by  the  Cre¬ 
ator  in  the  first  place.  We  have  already  noticed  that 
once  going  astray  sows  in  the  nature  the  seeds  of  corrup¬ 
tion  that  future  well-doing  will  not  remove.  In  this  way 
each  individual  man  creates  for  himself  a  necessity  for  a 
supernatural  Saviour,  that  was  not  an  attribute  of  his 
original  nature. 

174.  Q.  Did  not  the  fall  of  Adam  bring  upon 

man  his  necessity  for  a  Saviour? 

A.  No ;  we  have  seen  that  man  has  two  dif¬ 
ferent  necessities  for  a  Saviour,  —  the  one  natural  and 
the  other  artificial.  The  natural  was  his  need  of  power 
to  insure  his  resistance  to  temptation ;  the  other  was  his 
need  of  a  power  for  his  regeneration  after  he  had  yielded 
to  temptation.  The  natural  existed  before  the  fall ;  the 
artificial,  Adam  brought  upon  himself  by  the  transgression 
of  the  fall ;  but  he  did  not  bring  it  upon  any  one  else. 
Each  person  brings  upon  himself  his  own  necessity  for  a 
Saviour  for  his  own  forgiveness  and  regeneration. 

175.  Q.  What  connection  had  the  trial  and  the 
fall  of  the  first  Adam  with  human  necessities  for  a 
Saviour? 

A.  The  trial  and  the  fall  established  the  at¬ 
tractiveness  of  the  forbidden  to  human  nature  of  such 
a  magnitude  as  to  necessitate  a  superhuman  Saviour. 
This  necessity  the  Creator  made  inherent  in  human  na¬ 
ture,  and  it  was  outside  of  man’s  power  of  choice.  The 
fall  and  its  immediate  consequences  brought  to  light 
another  necessity  for  a  Saviour  that  was  within  the 
province  of  human  choice,  that  Adam  had  brought 


6o 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


upon  himself,  and  that  the  whole  of  his  issue  would 
probably  bring  upon  themselves.  This  was  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  one  that  could  take  away  the  guilt  and  the  pen¬ 
alty  for  actual  transgressions. 

1T6.  Q.  From  the  way  that  many  religious 
teachers  set  forth  this  subject,  what  are  some  of 
the  inferences  that  would  be  forced  upon  us? 

A.  (i)  That  man’s  principal  and  fundamental 
necessity  is  a  supernatural  Saviour,  to  take  away  the  guilt 
and  the  penalty  of  his  wrong-doing;  (2)  That  this  ne¬ 
cessity  was  brought  upon  all  men  by  the  transgressions 
of  the  first  parents  in  the  garden;  (3)  That  the  fall  of 
the  first  parents  entailed  upon  every  individual  of  the 
race,  in  advance  of  his  existence,  a  kind  of  disability  or 
corruption  that  made  his  salvation  impossible  without 
supernatural  intervention ;  (4)  That  the  fall  caused 
all  the  tendencies  to  wrong-doing  that  we  see  in  man¬ 
kind ;  (5)  That  all  the  suffering  and  death  of  our  Sa¬ 
viour  was  laid  upon  him  on  account  of  the  evil  deeds 
of  men. 

177.  Q.  What  may  be  said  in  regard  to  the 
first  inference? 

A.  It  requires  no  argument  to  show  that  man’s 
greatest  good  and  highest  attainment  is  to  be  like  his 
Saviour,  perfect  in  obedience.  It  follows  that  man’s 
greatest  necessity  is  of  a  power  sufficient  to  insure  such 
an  attainment.  If  man  in  himself  is  sufficient  to  insure 
it,  then  he  has  no  need  of  foreign  assistance.  But  the 
trial  of  the  first  Adam  proves  otherwise.  Man’s  greatest 
and  fundamental  necessity  is  of  a  Saviour  who  can  enable 
him  to  be  like  Jesus,  perfect  in  obedience.  Forgiveness 


PREVENTION  AND  CURE. 


6 1 


and  removal  of  guilt  is  a  necessity  for  those  who  have 
once  gone  astray,  as  a  means  toward  the  great  end, — 
obedience.  It  is,  however,  incidental,  because  it  is  not 
a  necessity  for  those  who  never  go  astray.  There  was 
one  such  man,  the  God-man,  and  there  is  no  logical 
reason  why  there  should  not  be  others.  T  herefore 
man’s  fundamental  necessity  is  for  supernatural  power 
to  enable  him  to  be  like  the  Saviour,  obedient.  This 
kind  of  necessity  was  his  before  he  had  brought  upon 
himself  another  necessity  by  his  disobedience.  It  con¬ 
tinued  his  after  he  had  gone  astray,  and  had  brought 
upon  himself  the  necessity  of  one  to  reinstate  him ;  and 
it  is  still  adhering  to  him  after  his  guilt  is  washed  away, 
and  he  is  a  new  creature. 

178.  Q.  What  absurdity  springs  out  of  making 
the  washing  away  of  guilt  and  the  removing  of  the 
penalty  the  whole  function  of  our  Saviour? 

A.  We  are  told  in  the  Scripture  that  there  is 
no  other  name  whereby  we  can  be  saved.  Now,  if  there 
are  any  who  do  not  go  astray  and  bring  upon  themselves 
guilt,  such  cannot  be  saved,  because  his  function  does  not 
reach  them. 

179.  Q.  What  standard  statement  is  always 
ready,  and  supposed  to  be  equal  to  dissolving 
this  difficulty? 

A.  It  is  said  that  every  man  goes  astray ;  com¬ 
mits  guilty  acts  that  necessitate  the  function  of  a  Saviour. 

180.  Q.  Does  this  statement  dissolve  the 
difficulty? 

A.  No  ;  cure  is  not  health.  To  the  sick,  cure 
is  a  necessity.  In  their  case  it  is  only  a  means  to  pro- 


62 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


mote  health,  and  is  of  value  only  to  the  degree  that  it 
tends  to  promote  health.  They  have  the  best  health 
who  have  no  necessity  for  a  cure,  and  that  is  the  highest 
function  of  a  physician  which  can  so  prescribe  for  a 
healthy  patient  as  to  exclude  the  necessity  for  a  cure. 
The  Great  Physician  is  incidentally  able  to  cure  the 
sin-sick,  but  his  highest  function  is  to  prescribe  for  the 
morally  healthy,  so  that  they  need  not  become  sin-sick. 
His  own  humanity,  through  his  divine  skill,  was  always 
preserved  in  this  way.  If  it  were  possible  to  prove  that 
all  become  morally  diseased  and  need  the  curative  power 
of  the  Great  Physician,  it  would  not  take  away  their  ne¬ 
cessity  for  that  higher  function.  Unless  the  Great  Phy¬ 
sician  can  prescribe  for  those  whom  he  has  cured  of 
sin-sickness,  as  well  as  for  those  who  are  always  morally 
well,  so  as  to  confirm  and  establish  their  health,  he  is  not 
equal  to  the  necessities  of  man.  Unless  he  can  preserve 
blameless  as  well  as  forgive,  he  is  not  a  sufficient  nor 
an  efficient  Saviour  for  man. 

181.  Q.  What  may  be  said  in  regard  to  the 
second  inference  in  question  176? 

A.  They  tell  us  that  God  created  man  in  his 
own  image,  holy ;  that  by  the  transgression  of  the  fall 
he  became  guilty,  and  brought  upon  himself  a  tendency 
to  wrong-doing ;  that  he  thus  lost  the  image  of  God,  and 
hence  arose  the  necessity  of  a  Saviour  for  him.  In  re¬ 
ply,  it  may  be  said  that  God  did  make  man  in  his  own 
image ;  but  this  image  consisted  in  an  intellectual  as  well 
as  a  moral  nature.  God  could  not  create  man  holy,  in 
a  positive  sense,  any  more  than  he  could  create  him 
guilty.  Man  did  not  lose  the  image  of  God  in  the  fall ; 
he  retains  his  intellectual  and  moral  powers  after  he  is 


PREVENTION  AND  CURE. 


63 


guilty.  The  fall  made  no  one  guilty  but  the  first  pa¬ 
rents,  who  transgressed.  It  did  not  originate  in  them 
their  tendency  to  wrong-doing,  for  this  tendency  ex¬ 
isted  before  the  fall ;  else  the  fall  would  have  been  an 
impossibility.  Man  is  lost,  not  on  account  of  his  ten¬ 
dency  to  wrong-doing,  but  when  he  commits  his  free 
agency  to  wrong-doing.  Each  individual  is  lost  on  ac¬ 
count  of  the  wrong  use  of  his  own  free  agency,  and  not 
on  account  of  that  of  the  first  parents.  Hence  the  trans¬ 
gressions  of  the  first  parents  in  the  garden  did  not  bring 
upon  men  their  necessities  for  a  Saviour. 

182.  Q.  What  may  be  said  in  regard  to  the 
third  inference  in  question  176? 

A.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  first  parents 
had  no  greater  power  to  transmit  their  attributes,  whether 
natural  or  artificial,  to  their  descendants,  than  other  hu¬ 
man  parents  have  ;  for  if  they  had,  either  they  or  others 
would  not  have  been  human.  The  first  parents  could 
not  carry  disabilities  many  generations.  Therefore  the 
third  inference  arises  from  a  false  position. 

183.  Q.  What  can  be  said  in  regard  to  the 
fourth  inference  in  question  176? 

A.  That  the  fall  of  our  first  parents  caused  all 
the  tendencies  to  wrong-doing  that  we  see  in  man¬ 
kind,  seems  to  follow  from  much  that  has  been  written. 
It  is,  however,  two  stages  away  from  the  truth.  In  the 
first  place,  the  test  case  of  the  fall,  though  initiating  the 
depravity  that  we  see  broadcast  in  the  world,  was  not  the 
cause  of  it.  Second,  if  it  had  been  the  cause  of  de¬ 
pravity,  it  would  not  have  been  the  cause  of  the  tenden¬ 
cies  seen  in  mankind  to  wrong-doing,  for  depravity  is 


64 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


secondary.  The  primary  cause  of  human  peril  is  the 
nature  given  to  man  by  the  Creator,  and  is  still  seen  at  a 
later  date  in  the  human  nature  of  Him  who  was  tempted 
like  as  we  are,  but  with  no  trace  of  depravity  in  his  nature. 

184.  Q.  What  may  be  said  in  regard  to  the 
fifth  inference  of  question  176  ? 

A.  That  the  sufferings  and  death  of  Christ  were 
necessary  to  constitute  him  a  forgiving  Saviour,  we  do 
not  deny.  But  we  do  deny  that  the  forgiving  power 
was  the  whole  of  his  function  as  man’s  Saviour.  We 
have  tried  to  prove  that  he  is  a  Saviour  in  a  far  more 
important  and  fundamental  sense  than  that  of  the  taking 
away  of  the  guilt  and  penalty  of  wrong-doing.  John 
seems  to  bring  out  this  important  side  of  the  Saviour’s 
power  when  he  says,  “  Behold  the  Lamb  of  God  that 
taketh  away  the  sin  of  the  world.”  This  is  more  generic 
than  taking  away  the  guilt  and  penalty  of  evil  deeds.  It 
is  taking  away  the  evil  deeds  themselves,  and  in  that  way 
reduces  the  necessity  of  the  forgiving  function.  That  the 
Saviour  is  actually  reducing  the  evil  deeds  of  men  no  one 
will  deny.  No  one  who  believes  Christianity  will  deny 
that  the  despised  Nazarene  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  wip¬ 
ing  away  of  the  slavery  of  the  middle  ages,  and  that  he 
has  been  and  always  will  be  at  the  bottom  of  every 
high  attainment  of  mankind.  Obedience  is  the  founda¬ 
tion  of  every  high  attainment.  Christ  is  the  power  that 
enables  man  to  be  obedient,  and  it  is  only  through  his 
suffering  and  death  that  he  acquired  this  power. 

185.  Q.  What  theory  is  frequently  held  in  con¬ 
nection  with  the  removal  of  depravity? 

A.  That  the  near  approach  of  the  death  of  a 
Christian  either  enables  or  makes  the  Saviour  willing  to 


PREVENTION  AND  CURE.  6 5 

remove  the  last  vestige  of  depravity  from  him,  so  that 
he  can  enter  into  the  new  world  completely  saved. 

186.  Q .  What  are  the  grounds  for  such  a 
theory? 

A.  Scarcely  more  than  those  arising  from  the 
necessities  connected  with  what  we  have  endeavored  to 
prove  are  false  conceptions  of  human  depravity.  The 
idea  is  frequently  held  that  depravity  is  blameworthy, 
and  no  person  possessing  any  vestige  of  it  can  be  in  a 
state  of  perfect  obedience.  This  doctrine,  taken  in  con¬ 
nection  with  the  fact  that  there  is  no  offer  of  forgiveness 
except  in  this  world,  seemed  to  preclude  the  salvation 
of  any ;  and  from  this  arose  the  doctrine  of  the  removal 
of  depravity  at  the  approach  of  death. 

187.  Q.  What  shall  we  say  to  this  doctrine? 

A.  That  the  presumption  is  against  it ;  that 
the  Scriptures  give  no  evidence  for  it,  and  that  the 
strongest  proof  must  be  given  before  we  should  ac¬ 
cept  it. 

188.  Q.  What,  according  to  our  deductions,  is 
a  partial  solution  of  the  problem  here  involved  ? 

A.  The  doctrine  seems  to  rest  upon  the  idea 
that  perfect  obedience  is  not  possible  as  long  as  there  is 
any  depravity.  We  claim,  however,  that  this  is  not  true. 
Depravity  seems  to  be  an  encumbrance  to  perfect  obe¬ 
dience,  but  not  a  bar.  Depravity  seems  to  be  no  more 
of  a  bar  than  is  the  original  weakness  with  which  the 
Creator  saw  fit  to  invest  man.  Salvation  is  obedience, 
and  complete  salvation  is  perfect  obedience,  and  can  be 
nothing  less.  But  the  Saviour’s  method  does  not  seem 
to  be  that  of  removing  either  the  weakness  or  the  de- 

5 


66  THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 

pravity  at  once.  Unless  the  Saviour  can  assist  man  to 
perfect  obedience,  he  is  imperfect  as  a  Saviour.  Per¬ 
fect  obedience,  however,  does  not  demand  choices  be¬ 
yond  attainments ;  it  does  not  demand  acts  of  brilliancy 
beyond  one’s  light ;  to  act  up  to  one’s  light  is  perfect 
obedience.  And  this  sort  of  a  life  may  be  found  in 
true  Christians  in  this  world  long  before  death.  De¬ 
pravity  may  be  of  so  grievous  a  kind  as  to  destroy  ac¬ 
countability.  Those  who  are  depraved  to  this  extent 
are  no  longer  moral  beings ;  they  are  negatives,  neither 
obedient  nor  disobedient. 

189.  Q.  What  has  been  the  cause  of  much  of 
the  ambiguity  in  the  presentation  of  truths  con¬ 
nected  with  the  human  moral  problem? 

A.  The  many  meanings  which  have  been  given 

to  the  word  “  sin.” 

190.  Q.  What  are  these  meanings? 

A.  The  primary  meaning  is  disobedience  to 
the  Creator’s  laws ;  and  it  would  be  better  if  the  word 
had  no  other  meaning.  But  religious  teachers  use  the 
word  in  other  ways.  King  James’s  Version  uses  it  with 
different  meanings,  and  Webster’s  Dictionary  recognizes 
them.  One  meaning  is  temptation  to  disobedience  ;  an¬ 
other  is  susceptibility  to  temptation ;  still  another  is 
human  depravity.  It  is  used  in  the  sense  of  the  short¬ 
comings  of  weakness  and  infirmity.  It  is  also  used  to 
signify  disobedience  in  the  abstract,  —  an  idea  that  is 
better  expressed  in  the  phrase  that  we  have  used, — 
the  forbidden. 

191.  Q.  What  does  the  word  “sin”  always 
suggest? 

A.  Guilt. 


PREVENTION  AND  CURE. 


67 


192.  Q.  Does  guilt  belong  to  sin? 

A.  Never,  except  when  used  in  its  primary 
sense.  There  is  no  guilt  in  temptation,  nor  in  suscep¬ 
tibility  to  temptation,  nor  in  depravity,  nor  in  the  short¬ 
comings  of  weakness  and  infirmity.  There  is  no  guilt  in 
the  forbidden  before  it  becomes  connected  with  the  free 
moral  agent. 

193.  Q.  What  should  theologians  and  religious 
teachers  do? 

A .  They  should  restrict  the  word  “  sin  ”  to 
those  acts  to  which  responsibility  and  guilt  unmistakably 
belong.  Much  of  the  controversy  concerning  Christian 
attainments  is  brought  about  by  one  party  restricting  the 
word  in  this  way,  and  the  other  embracing  in  it  the  short¬ 
comings  of  weakness  and  infirmity,  to  which  guilt  no  more 
belongs  than  it  does  to  the  stumbling  of  the  blind  man 
or  the  limping  of  the  cripple.  Many  discourses  on  the 
dreadful  guilt  of  sin  lose  their  effect,  since  the  speaker 
uses  the  word  in  various  senses,  only  one  of  which  has 
the  least  shade  of  guilt  attached  to  it, 

194.  Q.  What  has  generally  been  made  the 
fundamental  cause  of  man’s  necessity  for  the  su¬ 
pernatural  power  of  the  God-man? 

A.  The  fact  that  man  is  a  “  sinner.” 

195.  Q.  What  was  formerly  the  meaning  of 
the  word  “sinner”  in  this  connection? 

A.  The  word  referred  not  only  to  the  actual 
guilt  of  each  transgressor,  but  also  to  an  inherited  guilt 
that  each  one  was  supposed  to  have  acquired  trom 
Adam.  Each  person  was  therefore  supposed  to  be 


68 


THE  HUMAN  MORAL  PROBLEM. 


subject  to  punishment,  not  only  on  account  of  his  own 
guilt,  but  also  on  account  of  the  guilt  of  Adam. 

196.  0.  What  is  the  modern  meaning  of  the 
word  “  sinner”  in  this  connection? 

A.  An  actual  transgressor,  and  generally  some¬ 
thing  more.  Although  modern  teachers  do  not  say  that 
the  first  parents  transmitted  their  own  guilt  to  all  their 
issue,  they  still  sometimes  teach  that  the  first  parents  did 
fasten  some  sort  of  a  misty  disability  on  their  issue,  —  a 
disability  that  gives  rise  to  the  necessity  of  a  Saviour, 
and  which  the  Saviour  must  remove  in  order  to  produce 
complete  salvation. 

197.  Q.  What,  according  to  our  deductions,  is 
the  fundamental  cause  of  man’s  necessity  for  the 
supernatural  power  of  the  God-man? 

A.  It  is  man’s  extreme  liability  to  do  the  for¬ 
bidden  that  is  so  destructive  to  him.  We  would  not  de¬ 
tract  in  the  least  from  man’s  necessity  of  one  to  take 
away  his  guilt  after  he  has  actually  done  the  forbidden  ; 
but  we  regard  this  as  a  means  to  an  end,  which  end  is 
complete  obedience. 

198.  Q.  Is  the  removal  of  depravity  a  necessity 
unto  salvation? 

A.  According  to  our  deductions  it  is  not.  Sal¬ 
vation  is  complete  when  obedience  is  complete.  Obe¬ 
dience  tends  to  wipe  out  depravity,  but  it  does  not  do 
so  at  once ;  it  acts  gradually.  And  it  can  never  remove 
man’s  original  liability  to  temptation,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  fundamental  in  his  nature. 

199.  Q.  What  seems  to  have  been  an  error  in 
much  religious  teaching? 


PREVENTION  AND  CURE.  69 

A.  It  has  been  the  confounding  of  man’s  ten¬ 
dency  to  do  the  forbidden  with  the  actual  doing  of  the 
forbidden,  and  thus  making  it  a  necessity  that  this  ten¬ 
dency  should  be  removed  in  order  that  salvation  should 
be  complete.  This  our  Saviour,  in  his  own  person,  has 
clearly  demonstrated  not  to  be  true. 

200.  Q.  What  factor  in  human  moral  neces¬ 
sities  for  a  Saviour  have  some  writers  on  sys¬ 
tematic  theology  generally  overlooked  or  treated 
as  of  little  importance? 

A.  It  is  the  susceptibility  to  the  attractiveness 
of  the  forbidden,  with  which  the  Creator  originally  saw 
fit  to  invest  human  nature.  It  is  seen  in  its  purity  be¬ 
fore  the  advent  of  depravity  at  the  fall,  and  also  in  the 
nature  of  the  Incarnate  One  during  his  whole  stay  on 
earth ;  and  it  is  present  in  every  other  human  nature, 
more  or  less  mixed  with  the  artificial  disability,  —  human 
depravity. 


THE  END. 


